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Private Oppression: How Laws That Protect
Privacy Can Lead to Oppression
Teri Dobbins Baxter*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Americans value privacy. Indeed, the notion that certain aspects of
private life should be protected from government intrusion is
incorporated into many provisions of the U.S. Constitution. Other
federal laws and many state laws also protect the privacy of individuals
and groups. Such rights as the freedom to practice one’s chosen religion,
the freedom to raise children in the manner deemed best by parents, and
the right to marry are all privacy rights that are firmly established in the
United States. However, these privacy rights are not absolute. Laws
protecting children and other vulnerable individuals from abuse and
neglect may trump privacy rights. But laws protecting the privacy of
individuals or groups can make it difficult for government officials to
enforce laws designed to protect those at risk.
These problems have been studied in the context of violence against
women and children, although the focus has largely been on the status of
children or the public versus private nature of family relationships.1 In
contrast, this Article will identify laws that protect the privacy of
individuals and groups (particularly families) as well as the laws
designed to protect the health, dignity, and well-being of individuals.

*
Professor of Law, Saint Louis University. B.A., Duke University 1993; J.D., Duke
University 1997. The author thanks Alicia Seibel for her valuable research and drafting assistance.
1. See, e.g., MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN & ROXANNE MYKITIUK, THE PUBLIC NATURE OF
PRIVATE VIOLENCE 3 (1994) (“Feminist activists and legal practitioners have . . . developed legal
definitions of private violence that better reflected women’s experiences, pursued the prosecution
and punishment of violent men, and helped women to empower themselves.”); Elizabeth M.
Schneider, The Violence of Privacy, 23 CONN. L. REV. 973, 974 (1990) (“This essay explores the
ways in which concepts of privacy permit, encourage, and reinforce violence against women,
focusing on the complex interrelationship between notations of ‘public’ and ‘private’ in our social
understandings of woman-abuse.”); Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, A Public Role in the Private
Family: The Parental Rights and Responsibilities Act and the Politics of Child Protection and
Education, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 393, 393 (1996) (“address[ing] children’s needs for responsible
parenting and the continuing struggle to reach an appropriate balance between public and private
roles in meeting these basic needs and in preparing children for citizenship”).
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This Article will then examine how the enforcement of privacy laws can
deprive individuals of the protection of other laws, including laws that
guarantee individual rights and freedoms.
These issues will be viewed through the lens of the controversial
case of the children taken into state custody from the Yearning for Zion
Ranch (“YFZ Ranch” or “the Ranch”) in Texas. Specifically, the Article
will examine the allegations that led government authorities to intervene
and remove the children from the Ranch and the court battle that resulted
in the return of all but one child to their families. The Article will then
explore the difficulties the government faces when such allegations are
made against citizens of isolated communities who have little interaction
with the larger American society. This Article will further demonstrate
how privacy laws—originating in the U.S. Constitution, state
constitutions, federal and state statutes, and common law doctrines—
work together to make it possible for people to abuse or otherwise
oppress others who are under their control or influence.
This Article is not intended as a judgment or condemnation of the
YFZ residents or the Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ of Latter
Day Saints (“FLDS Church”), nor is it a judgment of the guilt or
innocence of any of those involved in the YFZ case. Indeed, in many
respects, the YFZ Ranch is similar to every individual household in the
United States. Every household enjoys a degree of privacy that cannot
be intruded upon by the government absent extraordinary circumstances.
However, the Ranch provides a degree of privacy that is not present for
most people in larger, particularly urban, communities. The Ranch
provides physical isolation of an entire, largely self-contained, multigenerational community. These unique features, in addition to the real
conflict that arose when state officials took custody of hundreds of
children that they believed were in danger of abuse at the YFZ Ranch,
make it a useful vehicle for exploring the issues of privacy, freedom, and
the potential for oppression.
Part II of this Article describes the YFZ Ranch and the events
leading up to and following government officials’ decision to remove
hundreds of children from the Ranch and place them in state custody.
Part III identifies provisions of the U.S. Constitution that protect privacy,
particularly in the context of families and religious beliefs and practices.
Part III also discusses the limits on the privacy rights conferred by
various constitutional provisions. Part IV examines privacy rights
conferred by state constitutions, statutes, and common law doctrines, as
well as circumstances in which state interests override privacy rights.
Part V reviews a bill introduced in the United States Senate to establish a
federal polygamy task force and summarizes testimony at a Senate
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Hearing on crimes associated with polygamy. Part VI then describes
how laws protecting privacy of all individuals can lead to the oppression
of some vulnerable groups or individuals. Finally, Part VII explores
ways in which government officials can prevent oppression and abuse
without violating privacy rights, including regulating home schooling
and establishing community outreach programs.
II. YEARNING FOR ZION RANCH
A. Yearning for Zion and the FLDS Church Background
The Yearning for Zion Ranch is a 1700 acre property located near
the town of Eldorado in Schleicher County, Texas.2 A number of
families associated with the FLDS Church live on the Ranch.3 The
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (also known as the Mormon
Church) previously embraced polygamy, but the practice was banned by
the Church in 1890.4 The FLDS Church—which separated from The
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints in the early twentieth
century—still practices and advocates polygamy, even though it is illegal
in all fifty states.5 Residents of the YFZ Ranch share these beliefs and
allegedly practice polygamy, with men entering into “spiritual”
marriages with multiple women.6 Young girls are alleged to have been
“married” to adult (often much older) men when the girls are under the
age of sixteen, the youngest age at which minors can be married in Texas
without a court order.7 Moreover, girls as young as thirteen are alleged
to have been impregnated by their “spiritual husbands.”8
B. Government Removal of Yearning for Zion Children and Subsequent
Court Orders
In late March 2008, the Texas Department of Family and Protective
Services (DFS) received a telephone call from a girl named Sarah who

2. In re Tex. Dep’t of Family & Protective Servs., 255 S.W.3d 613, 613 (Tex. 2008).
3. In re Steed, No. 03-08-00235-CV, 2008 WL 2132014, at *1 (Tex. App. May 22, 2008) (per
curiam).
4. Bronson v. Swensen, 500 F.3d 1099, 1103 n.3 (10th Cir. 2007).
5. CAROLYN JESSOP & LAURA PALMER, ESCAPE 18 (2007).
6. Because polygamy is illegal, the men cannot enter into more than one legal marriage. In re
Tex. Dep’t of Family & Protective Servs., 255 S.W.3d at 613.
7. Id. at 616 (O’Neill, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
8. In re Steed, 2008 WL 2132014, at *2 n.5.
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claimed that she was being physically and sexually abused at the Ranch.9
DFS investigators and law enforcement officials entered the Ranch
several days later in early April 2008.10 They interviewed adults and
children and, without a court order, ultimately took possession of all of
the girls and boys present at the Ranch—approximately 468 children.11
Under Texas law, DFS officials are allowed to take children into
custody on an emergency basis if “the circumstances indicate a danger to
the physical health and welfare of the children and the need for
protection of the children is so urgent that immediate removal of the
children from the home is necessary.”12 DFS claimed that such a danger
existed based upon the following evidence:
•

Interviews with investigators revealed a pattern of girls
reporting that “there was no age too young for girls to be
married”;

•

Twenty females living at the ranch had become pregnant
between the ages of thirteen and seventeen;

•

Five of the twenty females identified as having become
pregnant between the ages of thirteen and seventeen [were]
alleged to be minors, the other fifteen are now adults;

•

Of the five minors who became pregnant, four [were]
seventeen, and one [was] sixteen, and all five [were] alleged to
have become pregnant at the age of fifteen or sixteen;

•

The Department’s lead investigator was of the opinion that
due to the “pervasive belief system” of the FLDS, the male
children are groomed to be perpetrators of sexual abuse and
the girls are raised to be victims of sexual abuse.13

According to DFS, the children were removed from the Ranch “under the
theory that the ranch community was ‘essentially one household
comprised of extended family subgroups’ with a single, common belief
system and there was reason to believe that a child had been sexually
abused in the ranch ‘household.’”14
9. In re Tex. Dep’t of Family & Protective Servs., 255 S.W.3d at 613.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 613–14. Sarah was never found. Id. at 614.
12. In re Steed, 2008 WL 2132014, at *1.
13. Id. at **1–2. Additionally, “[o]ne woman [was] alleged to have become pregnant at the age
of thirteen.” Id. at *2 n.5.
14. Id. at *2.
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DFS filed suits affecting the parent-child relationship (SAPCRs) and
after an adversary hearing the district court issued temporary orders
continuing DFS’s custody of the children.15 Thirty-eight mothers filed
petitions for writ of mandamus in the court of appeals seeking to have
the district court’s order vacated and their 126 children returned.16 The
court of appeals found that the evidence presented at the district court
hearing was “legally and factually insufficient to support the findings
required” by Texas Family Code section 262.201 to allow DFS to
maintain custody of the children.17 Because DFS failed to meet its
burden of proof under the statute, the court of appeals directed the
district court to vacate its orders granting sole managing conservatorship
to DFS.18
DFS then filed a petition for writ of mandamus in the Texas Supreme
Court.19 The court denied the petition, saying “[h]aving carefully
examined the . . . evidence before us, we are not inclined to disturb the
court of appeals’ decision. On the record before us, removal of the
children was not warranted.”20 While the opinion was unanimous with
respect to the male and prepubescent female children, several justices
dissented from the opinion to the extent that it ordered the return of the
pubescent female children.21
The dissenting justices found that the evidence was sufficient to
satisfy the standard of section 262.201 that pubescent girls were at risk of
sexual abuse.22 In particular, the expert witness called by the children’s
families testified that “the Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter Day Saints accepts the age of ‘physical development’ (that is, first
menstruation) as the age of eligibility for ‘marriage.’”23 Additionally, a
child psychologist testified that “the pregnancy of the underage children
on the Ranch was the result of sexual abuse because children of the age
of fourteen, fifteen, or sixteen are not sufficiently emotionally mature to
enter a healthy consensual sexual relationship or a ‘marriage.’”24
The dissenting opinion further pointed out that efforts to enable the
children to return home—by seeking restraining orders against the
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

In re Tex. Dep’t of Family & Protective Servs., 255 S.W.3d at 614–15.
Id. at 615.
In re Steed, 2008 WL 2132014, at *4.
Id.
In re Tex. Dep’t of Family & Protective Servs., 255 S.W.3d at 615.
Id.
Id. at 616–17 (O’Neill, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id.
Id. at 616.
Id.
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alleged perpetrators of the abuse—were thwarted by the mothers and
children:
When the Department arrived at the YFZ Ranch, it was treated
cordially and allowed access to children, but those children repeatedly
pled “the Fifth” in response to questions about their identity, would not
identify their birth-dates or parentage, refused to answer questions
about who lived in their homes, and lied about their names—sometimes
several times. Answers from parents were similarly inconsistent: one
mother first claimed that four children were hers, and then later avowed
that they were not. Furthermore, the Department arrived to discover
that a shredder had been used to destroy documents just before its
arrival.25

Based on the evidence relating to pubescent girls, the dissent would have
granted DFS’s petition for mandamus.26
C. Yearning for Zion Residents’ Response
It is important to note that the YFZ residents have disputed the
allegations of sexual abuse, and in interviews after the raid, many
residents denied any knowledge of sexual abuse or underage girls being
married to older men.27 Moreover, the residents characterize their living
arrangement as beneficial to the women and children of the families,
with several women living with one man and the children of all of the
women being raised together in a loving, supportive environment.28
Several women may be “married” to the same man, but the women insist
that they have no objection to the arrangement.29 The women view
themselves as mother to all of the children in the household and consider
jealousy to be a sin or weakness that they must overcome in order to be
like God.30 The children do not spend time in meaningless pursuits such
as “play time,” nor are fairy tales read to the children.31 Instead, the
children work alongside the adults to grow food and maintain the
households and community.32 Food is shared among all households and

25. Id. at 617–18.
26. Id. at 618.
27. The Oprah Winfrey Show: Oprah Goes Inside the Yearning for Zion Polygamist Ranch
(ABC television broadcast Mar. 30, 2009).
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
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goods are available to all in need at no cost.33 Daily worship is also an
integral part of everyday life.34
The residents view the Ranch as a safe environment where everyone
works and strives to be like Christ.35 In their view, being removed from
the violence and corruption of the larger society protects the women and
children instead of harming or oppressing them.36 The raid by
government officials and the emotional devastation that resulted for the
families seemed to reinforce the view among residents that the
government causes harm instead of preventing it.37 One woman who
was taken from the Ranch when she was fourteen—because her mother
feared the girl was about to be married to an older man—returned to the
Ranch shortly after her eighteenth birthday, preferring the life on the
Ranch to the outside world.38
III. PRIVACY RIGHTS PROTECTED BY THE U.S. CONSTITUTION
Privacy rights are protected by a variety of sources, with the U.S.
Constitution being the preeminent source. While the Constitution does
not refer explicitly to privacy, several provisions, including the First,
Fourth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments, have been interpreted as
protecting privacy rights in various degrees and contexts.
A. First Amendment Protection
1. Free Exercise Clause
The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution states in part:
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .”39 These provisions, also
known as the “Free Exercise Clause” and the “Establishment Clause,”
prevent the government from regulating religious beliefs or doctrines.40
Thus, the government may neither compel nor punish particular religious
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. The woman, named Betty Jessop, is the daughter of Carolyn Jessop, co-author of
ESCAPE. See supra note 5. Carolyn Jessop’s Senate testimony criticizing the FLDS Church is
discussed infra Part V.B.
39. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
40. Employment Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877–78 (1990).
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doctrine.41 Nor may it impose burdens on specific religious groups on
the basis of their beliefs.42
The state may only intrude upon or limit religious liberty if “it is
essential to accomplish an overriding governmental interest.”43
Consequently, religious beliefs will be accommodated by the
government unless restriction is necessary for the common good.44 In
the past, the government has accommodated, among many others, a
religious group who refused to send their children to school because it
violated their religious beliefs,45 a group who employed animal sacrifice
as part of their religious ceremonies,46 and a student whose religious
beliefs were violated by a requirement that she utter certain words as part
of assignments in a state university’s theater program.47 In each case,
courts found no government interest sufficiently compelling to overcome
the right to free exercise of religion.48
In the landmark case of Employment Division, Department of Human
Resources of Oregon v. Smith, the Supreme Court noted that in prior
decisions it had applied a balancing test when parties sought exemption
from generally applicable laws.49 Under that test, “governmental actions
that substantially burden a religious practice must be justified by a
compelling governmental interest.”50 However, in Smith, the Court
changed its position and concluded that the test is inapplicable to such
challenges.51 “The government’s ability to enforce generally applicable
prohibitions of socially harmful conduct, like its ability to carry out other

41. See id.
42. Id. at 877. “The government may not compel affirmation of religious belief, punish the
expression of religious doctrines it believes to be false, impose special disabilities on the basis of
religious views or religious status, or lend its power to one or the other side in controversies over
religious authority or dogma.” Id. (citations omitted).
43. United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 257–58 (1982). This standard has become known as
the strict scrutiny test. See, e.g., Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508
U.S. 520, 546 (1993) (“A law burdening religious practice that is not neutral or not of general
application must undergo the most rigorous of scrutiny. . . . A law that targets religious conduct for
distinctive treatment or advances legitimate governmental interests only against conduct with a
religious motivation will survive strict scrutiny only in rare cases.”).
44. Lee, 455 U.S. at 259.
45. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 207, 236 (1972) (members of Amish religion).
46. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. at 524 (members of Santeria religion).
47. Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277, 1280–81 (10th Cir. 2004) (member of The Church
of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints).
48. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. at 546; Yoder, 406 U.S. at 233–34; AxsonFlynn, 356 F.3d at 1295.
49. Employment Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 883 (1990).
50. Id.
51. Id. at 885.
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aspects of public policy, ‘cannot depend on measuring the effects of a
governmental action on a religious objector’s spiritual development.’”52
Congress responded to this decision by passing the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA).53 The Act states that
“[g]overnment shall not substantially burden a person’s exercise of
religion even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability,
except as provided in subsection (b).”54 The exceptions allow the burden
if it “(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest,” and (2)
the government has employed the least restrictive means of furthering
that interest.55 Thus, Congress sought to reinstate the compelling interest
test that the Supreme Court rejected in Smith.56
Congress’s effort was only partially successful. In City of Boerne v.
Flores, the Supreme Court held that Congress exceeded its enforcement
authority under the Fourteenth Amendment in enacting RFRA, at least
insofar as it applied to the states.57 The statute—and the compelling
interest test included therein—remains effective and binding on the
federal government.58 Consequently, a generally applicable law that
burdens the free exercise of religion does not violate the First
Amendment, but if it is a federal law, it may violate RFRA. The
residents of the YFZ Ranch, therefore, cannot rely on the Free Exercise
Clause to exempt them from generally applicable state laws even if those
laws conflict with their sincerely held religious beliefs.59
2. Freedom of Intimate Association and Freedom of Expressive
Association
Supreme Court decisions have recognized that the First Amendment
to the U.S. Constitution protects freedom of association in two different

52. Id. (quoting Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 451 (1988)).
53. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2006).
54. Id. § 2000bb-1(a).
55. Id. § 2000bb-1(b).
56. Id. § 2000bb(a).
57. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997). “Broad as the power of Congress is
under the Enforcement Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, RFRA contradicts vital principles
necessary to maintain separation of powers and the federal balance.” Id.
58. See Gonzales v. O Centro Espírita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 439 (2006)
(applying RFRA to case challenging the federal Controlled Substances Act which members of a
religious sect claimed burdened the exercise of their religion).
59. They may, however, rely on a state law that is substantially similar to RFRA that was
passed in 1999. See, e.g., TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 110.003 (Vernon 2005); see
discussion infra Part IV.B.
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contexts.60 First, “the Court has concluded that choices to enter into and
maintain certain intimate human relationships must be secured against
undue intrusion by the State because of the role of such relationships in
safeguarding the individual freedom that is central to our constitutional
scheme.”61 This has been termed “freedom of intimate association.”62
The Court has not attempted to define precisely which relationships
receive this constitutional protection, but it has noted that “certain kinds
of personal bonds have played a critical role in the culture and traditions
of the Nation,”63 and those relationships reflect “the realization that
individuals draw much of their emotional enrichment from close ties
with others.”64
Still, not every personal relationship is protected. Affiliations that
have been recognized as worthy of constitutional protection include
those involved in the creation and sustenance of a family or marriage, the
raising and education of children, and cohabitation with relatives.65 The
Court noted that these family relationships are distinguished by “relative
smallness, a high degree of selectivity in decisions to begin and maintain
the affiliation, and seclusion from others in critical aspects of the
relationship.”66 The Court concluded that only relationships with similar
qualities are likely to be protected by the freedom of intimate association
guarantee of the First Amendment.67
The second category of freedom of association is called “freedom of
expressive association.”68 This kind of association refers to “a right to
associate for the purpose of engaging in those activities protected by the
First Amendment—speech, assembly, petition for the redress of
grievances, and the exercise of religion.”69 The “right to associate with
others in pursuit of a wide variety of political, social, economic,
educational, religious, and cultural ends” is implicit in the right to engage
in activities protected by the First Amendment.70
60. Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 617 (1984).
61. Id. at 617–18.
62. Id. at 618.
63. Id. at 618–19.
64. Id. at 619.
65. Id. (citing Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383–86 (1978); Carey v. Population Servs.
Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 684–86 (1977); Smith v. Org. of Foster Families for Equal. & Reform, 431 U.S.
816, 844 (1977); Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, Ohio, 431 U.S. 494, 503–04 (1977)).
66. Id. at 620.
67. Id. In the Jaycees case, the Court held that membership in the Jaycees was not within the
category of relationships protected by the Constitution. Id. at 620–21.
68. Id. at 618.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 622.
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Neither the freedom of intimate association nor the freedom of
expressive association is absolute.
However, because both are
fundamental rights,71 government interference is subject to strict
scrutiny.72 A party’s freedom of association may only be infringed upon
if justified by a compelling state interest.73 Moreover, the state must
show that the interest cannot be achieved through significantly less
restrictive means.74
With respect to the YFZ residents, the freedom of intimate
association certainly applies to their family relationships, marriages, the
desire to raise and educate their children consistent with their religious
beliefs, and the choice to live with other family members. Additionally,
the YFZ residents have a protected right of expressive association to the
extent that they associate for the purpose of engaging in activities
protected by the First Amendment. In particular, they have a right to
associate for the purpose of exercising their religion and pursuing social
and educational goals. Living together in a community, worshiping
together, and educating their children in religious schools are all
protected forms of expressive association. The State of Texas cannot
infringe upon these rights unless justified by a compelling state interest
that cannot be achieved through less restrictive means.
B. Limits on First Amendment Protection
1. Freedom of Religion and Family Privacy Yield to the Interest in
Protecting Minors from Abuse and Neglect
While the U.S. Constitution guarantees parents a great deal of
latitude in determining how to raise their children, their rights are
somewhat limited when the child’s physical health is at issue. While the
Supreme Court has not expressly addressed the rights of parents to refuse
potentially life-saving treatment for their children if the treatment
violates the parents’ or children’s religious beliefs, state and lower
federal courts facing the issue have held that court orders authorizing
71. La. Debating & Literary Ass’n v. City of New Orleans, 42 F.3d 1483, 1498 (5th Cir. 1995).
72. Jaycees, 468 U.S. at 623.
73. Id.; see also La. Debating & Literary Ass’n, 42 F.3d at 1498 (noting that freedom of
intimate association is also subject to strict scrutiny which requires the government to show a
compelling interest that “cannot be achieved through means significantly less restrictive of one’s
associational freedom”).
74. Jaycees, 468 U.S. at 623. In the Jaycees case, the Court held that Minnesota had a
compelling interest in eradicating gender-based discrimination and that the interest justified
infringement on the Jaycees’ freedom of expressive association. Id. at 623–25.
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treatment over the parents’ objections do not violate the parents’
constitutional rights.75
In Jehovah’s Witnesses v. King County Hospital Unit No. 1, a class
consisting of adult and minor members of the Jehovah’s Witnesses (an
unincorporated religious association) and their governing agency argued
that provisions of the Washington Juvenile Court Law were
unconstitutional as applied to them.76 The plaintiffs’ religious beliefs
prohibited receiving blood transfusions.77 The provisions at issue
defined “dependent child” to include a child “who is grossly and wilfully
neglected as to medical care necessary for his well-being.”78 The
Juvenile Court was authorized under a separate provision to enter orders
for the care of any such dependent child.79 The plaintiffs’ complaint
alleged that the defendant physicians, hospitals, superior court judges,
and juvenile court employees invoked these provisions to obtain court
orders to remove minor children of Jehovah’s Witnesses from their
parents’ custody when the parents refused to give consent for blood
transfusions for the children.80 The children become wards of the court,
and the court then authorizes the blood transfusions over the parents’
objections.81
The plaintiffs alleged that the application of the Juvenile Court Law
under such circumstances violated their constitutional rights.82
Specifically, they alleged violation of their First Amendment rights to
freedom of association, free exercise of religion, and the Establishment
Clause; denial of life, liberty, and property without due process of law in
violation of the Fifth Amendment; denial of their right to family privacy
in violation of the Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments; and denial of the
75. See, e.g., Jehovah’s Witnesses v. King County Hosp. Unit No. 1, 278 F. Supp. 488, 505
(W.D. Wash. 1967) (“‘Parents may be free to become martyrs themselves. But it does not follow
they are free, in identical circumstances, to make martyrs of their children before they have reached
the age of full and legal discretion when they can make that choice for themselves.’” (quoting Prince
v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 170 (1944))), aff’d, 390 U.S. 598 (1968); O.G. v. Baum, 790
S.W.2d 839, 840–41 (Tex. App. 1990) (“The parents’ first and fourteenth amendment guarantee of
religious freedom does not include the liberty to expose their child to ill health or death.”).
76. Jehovah’s Witnesses, 278 F. Supp. at 499.
77. Id. at 502. “Plaintiffs believe and accept as authoritative and binding upon them the
admonition of Almighty God Jehovah found in the Holy Bible commanding Christians to ‘abstain
from blood.’” Id. The plaintiffs also believed that blood transfusions were risky, of limited or no
medical value, and that alternative means of treatment were always available that made transfusions
unnecessary and unadvisable. Id. at 503.
78. Id. at 498 n.1 (quoting WASH. REV. CODE § 13.04.010(12)).
79. Id. (quoting WASH. REV. CODE § 13.04.095).
80. Id. at 500.
81. Id.
82. Id.
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equal protection of the laws.83 The plaintiffs sought a declaration that the
disputed provisions were unconstitutional and invalid as applied to them
and sought to enjoin state judges and other government agents from
declaring children of plaintiffs or members of the plaintiff class to be
wards of the state under those provisions solely based on the parents’
refusal to authorize blood transfusions on religious or medical grounds.84
The district court believed that the United States Supreme Court’s
holding in Prince v. Massachusetts was applicable to Jehovah’s
Witnesses.85 While acknowledging that the Supreme Court did not
intend for the holding in Prince to be extended beyond its facts, the
district court nevertheless believed that “it does lay the foundation,
binding upon us, for the particular state intervention in the name of
health and welfare which is here under review.”86 In particular, the
district court referenced the following language in Prince: “The right to
practice religion freely does not include liberty [to] expose . . . the
child . . . to ill health or death.”87 In accordance with Prince, the district
court held that the Juvenile Court Code was not invalid under the U.S.
Constitution.88 The Supreme Court affirmed the decision in a one line
per curiam opinion citing Prince.89
In Texas, courts have relied on the Family Code’s sections that
authorize government action to protect minors’ health and safety when
granting government officers or entities temporary custody of minors
whose parents refuse to allow necessary medical treatment.90 In O.G. v.
Baum, a sixteen-year-old minor had been seriously injured when he was
hit by a train and needed surgery to try to save his right arm.91 In a
sworn statement presented to the trial court, the minor’s doctor stated
that a blood transfusion might be necessary during the course of the

83. Id. at 500–01.
84. Id. at 501.
85. Id. at 504.
86. Id.
87. Id. (quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166–67 (1944)).
88. Id. at 505. The district court further noted that both the Illinois Supreme Court and the New
Jersey Supreme Court had similarly interpreted Prince in cases involving blood transfusions for
minor children of Jehovah’s Witnesses. Id.
89. Jehovah’s Witnesses v. King County Hosp. Unit No. 1, 390 U.S. 598, 598 (1968) (per
curiam).
90. See O.G. v. Baum, 790 S.W.2d 839, 840 (Tex. App. 1990). At the time of that decision,
Chapter 17 of the Family Code authorized appointment of a temporary managing conservator of the
minor. See id. That chapter was repealed and the relevant provisions are now contained in Chapter
262 of the Family Code. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 262.110 (2008).
91. Baum, 790 S.W.2d at 840.
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surgery.92 The minor’s parents refused to allow the transfusion and the
minor signed a statement purporting to release the hospital and
physicians from any liability to him as a result of not giving the
transfusion.93 Child Protective Services (CPS) filed suit and was
appointed temporary managing conservator for the minor.94 The sole
ground for the appointment was the parents’ refusal to allow the
transfusion.95 The parents filed a petition for writ of mandamus, arguing
that the trial court abused its discretion in entering the temporary
conservatorship order because the order infringed upon the free exercise
of their religion and their right to privacy as guaranteed by the U.S. and
Texas constitutions and Texas common law.96
The court of appeals also cited Prince’s statement limiting parents’
First and Fourteenth Amendment rights when their children’s lives are at
stake.97 The court then noted that other courts addressing the
constitutionality of court orders consenting to blood transfusions over the
parents’ religious objections have held that such orders do not violate the
parents’ constitutional rights.98 Moreover, no contrary authority with
respect to the U.S. Constitution, Texas Constitution, or Texas common
law was cited by the parents.99 Consequently, the court of appeals held
that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in appointing CPS
temporary managing conservator of the minor.100
While there were no allegations that the YFZ parents neglected to
provide necessary medical care to their children, it is worth noting that
the Texas authorities would be justified in taking custody of the children
on the Ranch if there was evidence that medically necessary treatment
was being withheld on religious grounds. Indeed, such allegations have
been made by a former member of another FLDS Church community.101

92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. (citing Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166–67 (1944)).
98. Id. at 841 (citing Jehovah’s Witnesses v. King County Hosp. Unit No. 1, 278 F. Supp. 488,
505 (W.D. Wash. 1967), aff’d, 390 U.S. 598 (1968); Staelens v. Yake, 432 F. Supp. 834, 839 (N.D.
Ill. 1977)).
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. JESSOP & PALMER, supra note 5, at 230 (“[Warren Jeffs] began preaching that anyone who
needed medical help to heal was a person of little faith. A person in harmony with God could heal
him- or herself with fasting and prayer. Before I saw this play out in our own home, I knew of
several people who nearly died and children who became severely ill before they were taken to the
hospital as a last resort.”).
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2. Laws Advancing Compelling State Interests May Justify
Infringement on Freedom of Association
States can enforce laws that infringe on freedom of association if the
infringement is justified by a compelling state interest, is unrelated to the
suppression of ideas, and the interest cannot be achieved through
significantly less restrictive means.102 In Roberts v. United States
Jaycees, the national Jaycees organization alleged that the Minnesota
Human Rights Act violated its members’ freedom of association rights
because the Act required the admission of women as members of its
Minnesota chapters.103 The Court was persuaded that Minnesota had a
compelling interest in eradicating discrimination against its female
citizens and ensuring equal access to publicly available goods and
services.104 Moreover, the State sought to advance these interests
through the least restrictive means.105 “[E]ven if enforcement of the Act
causes some incidental abridgment of the Jaycees’ protected speech, that
effect is no greater than is necessary to accomplish the State’s legitimate
purposes.”106
In Buckley v. Valeo, the Court addressed a First Amendment
challenge to a federal law that imposed reporting and disclosure
requirements on political parties.107 The Court found compelling
governmental interests in: providing information about who has
contributed to a candidate’s campaign and how that money was spent;108
avoiding corruption and the appearance of corruption by publicizing
large contributions and expenditures;109 and gathering information
necessary to identify violations of contribution limits.110 The parties
challenging the disclosure laws conceded, and the Court agreed, “that
disclosure requirements—certainly in most applications—appear to be
the least restrictive means of curbing the evils of campaign ignorance
and corruption that Congress found to exist.”111 However, the Court
found a diminished state interest in the disclosure of contributions made

102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984).
Id. at 615.
Id. at 623.
Id. at 626.
Id. at 628.
424 U.S. 1, 6 (1976) (per curiam).
Id. at 66–67.
Id. at 67.
Id. at 67–68.
Id. at 68.
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to minor candidates with little chance of winning an election.112 On the
record in that case, the Court found that “the substantial public interest in
disclosure identified by the legislative history of this Act outweighs the
harm generally alleged.”113
Likewise, in United States v. Lee, the Court held that an Amish
employer was not exempt from paying social security taxes even though
the payment of such taxes violated his religious beliefs.114 The Court
found that the governmental interest in the social security system was
apparent in the variety of benefits available to all participants.115 The
system relies upon mandatory participation by employers and employees
in order to remain viable.116 “[T]he Government’s interest in assuring
mandatory and continuous participation in and contribution to the social
security system is very high.”117 Moreover, accommodating the religious
beliefs of individuals would be untenable:118
The tax system could not function if denominations were allowed to
challenge the tax system because tax payments were spent in a manner
that violates their religious belief. Because the broad public interest in
maintaining a sound tax system is of such a high order, religious belief
in conflict with the payment of taxes affords no basis for resisting the
tax.119

Congress had already provided an exemption for self-employed Amish
and others whose religious beliefs forbade payment of social security
taxes and the Court noted that this exemption demonstrated Congress’s
sensitivity to the rights afforded by the Free Exercise Clause and the
religious beliefs of individuals.120 However, it noted that the exemption
was limited to self-employed individuals, which created a narrow group
of readily identifiable persons to whom the exemption would apply.121

112. Id. at 70.
113. Id. at 72.
114. 455 U.S. 252, 260 (1982).
115. Id. at 258.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 258–59.
118. Id. at 259.
119. Id. at 260 (citations omitted).
120. Id. at 260–61. Congress provided an exemption from the social security tax for selfemployed members of religious groups whose beliefs were violated by such payments if the
individual met certain criteria, including a waiver of his or her right to all social security benefits and
proof that the religious group made sufficient provision for its dependent members. Id. at 255–56
(citing 26 U.S.C. § 1402(g)). However, the defendant in Lee employed several other employees and,
therefore, he did not qualify for the exemption. Id. at 256.
121. Id. at 260.
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Expanding the exemption to include employers would not only broaden
the scope of the exemption tremendously, it would also impose the
employer’s religious beliefs on the employees.122 Consequently, the tax
was held to be constitutional as applied to Lee.123
C. Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause Protection and Its
Limits
1. Substantive Due Process Protects Against Undue Regulation of
Families and Intimate Relationships
While the state has the authority to regulate in ways that affect
families,124 the Supreme Court has consistently protected “the private
realm of family life which the state cannot enter.”125 The Court has
described the policy behind such protection:
These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a
person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and
autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the right to define one’s own
concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of
human life. Beliefs about these matters could not define the attributes
of personhood were they formed under compulsion of the State.126

Over the last hundred years, the Court has held that the Due Process
Clause protects the right to make decisions relating to marriage,127
procreation,128 contraception,129 child rearing and education, 130 and the
right of adults to engage in consensual sexual acts in private.131
Of particular relevance to the YFZ case is parents’ right to send their
children to private or religious schools for their education. In Pierce v.
Society of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus and Mary, private and
122. Id. at 261.
123. Id.
124. Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, Ohio, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977) (“Of course, the family is
not beyond regulation.”).
125. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).
126. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992).
127. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
128. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153–54 (1973).
129. Casey, 505 U.S. at 851; Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453–54 (1972); Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965).
130. Pierce v. Soc’y of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus & Mary, 268 U.S. 510, 534–35
(1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
131. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
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religious schools filed suit to challenge Oregon’s Compulsory Education
Act, which required parents to send all children between the ages of eight
and sixteen to public schools.132 The plaintiffs alleged that the Act
violated their Fourteenth Amendment rights.133 The Supreme Court did
not question the state’s power to regulate, supervise, inspect, and
examine schools, teachers, and students; to require that all children of a
certain age attend some school; or to require certain subjects be taught.134
However, the Court believed that the Act “unreasonably interferes with
the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and
education of children under their control.”135
This right has been extended in many states to allow parents to teach
their children at home instead of sending their children to public or
private schools. In Texas, home schools are recognized as a type of
private school, which is expressly allowed under the state compulsory
education law.136 Thus, under Texas law, the YFZ parents have the right
to home school their children.137
This privacy interest also limits the degree to which the state can
prevent extended families from living together. In Moore v. City of East
Cleveland, Ohio, the Court held that a city ordinance that prohibited
certain members of an extended family from living in the same
household violated the parties’ substantive due process rights under the
Fourteenth Amendment.138 In that case, Moore was convicted of
violating a city housing ordinance when she allowed her grandson to
move into her home.139 Moore’s son and grandson (uncle and cousin to
the second grandson) were already living with her at the time.140 Under
the ordinance, occupancy of the house was limited to a single family.141
The term “family” was defined in a way that did not encompass the
arrangement in Moore’s household.142
The city claimed that the Court’s decision in Village of Belle Terre v.
Boraas143 was controlling.144 In Belle Terre, the Court upheld an
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

Pierce, 268 U.S. at 529–32.
Id. at 533.
Id. at 534.
Id. at 534–35.
Tex. Educ. Agency v. Leeper, 893 S.W.2d 432, 443–44 (Tex. 1994).
See id.
Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, Ohio, 431 U.S. 494, 504–06 (1977).
Id. at 496–97.
Id. at 496.
Id. at 495–96.
Id. at 496 n.2.
416 U.S. 1 (1974).
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ordinance restricting land use to single family dwellings.145 “Family”
was defined to mean “one or more persons related by blood, adoption, or
marriage, living and cooking together as a single housekeeping unit,
exclusive of household servants.”146 The plaintiffs were owners of a
house that they leased to six unrelated students attending a nearby
university.147 The plaintiffs were charged with violating the ordinance
and filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging violation of their
constitutional rights.148 The district court upheld the ordinance and the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed.149 The Supreme Court held
that there was no constitutional violation.150 First, the Court found that
no fundamental right such as voting, right of association, or right of
privacy was involved.151 Next, it noted that when legislating with respect
to social or economic issues, no equal protection violation will be found
if the law is reasonable, not arbitrary, and bears a rational relationship to
a legitimate state objective.152 Because the ordinance met that test, it did
not infringe on the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.153
The city of East Cleveland argued that the ordinance under which
Moore was convicted should be upheld on the same grounds as those in
Belle Terre.154 The Supreme Court disagreed.155 The Court believed that
“one overriding factor sets this case apart from Belle Terre. The
ordinance there affected only unrelated individuals.”156 Because the East
Cleveland ordinance sought to regulate families, Belle Terre did not
control.157
The Court acknowledged that housing ordinances may be a valid
means of advancing legitimate governmental interests, but noted that the

144. Moore, 431 U.S. at 498.
145. Belle Terre, 416 U.S. at 8–9. The ordinance excluded “lodging houses, boarding houses,
fraternity houses, or multiple-dwelling houses.” Id. at 2.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 2–3.
148. Id. at 3.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 7–9.
151. Id. at 7.
152. Id. at 8.
153. See id. at 8–9.
154. Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, Ohio, 431 U.S. 494, 498 (1977).
155. Id. at 498–99.
156. Id. at 498.
157. Id. at 498–99.
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Court has previously held that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment protects freedom of personal choice in matters of family
life.158 Although prior cases recognizing a due process right did not deal
with housing choices or with rights for family members beyond the
nuclear family, the Court noted that there is no precise formula for
determining when the Due Process Clause applies and provides
protection.159 Moreover, the family was recognized as an institution that
is “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition,”160 and that
tradition has not been limited to nuclear families.161 Consequently, the
Due Process Clause applied and protected the Moore family.162 The
Court held that the ordinance in question had only a tenuous relation to
the stated goals of controlling traffic and parking congestion and limiting
the burden on the public school system.163 These objectives did not
justify the burden on the Moore family, and the ordinance was held to be
unconstitutional.164
The YFZ residents allegedly include several households with
interrelated and extended families.165 The Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment protects the rights of those families and their
choice to live together in the same household and would limit the State
of Texas’s ability to regulate or alter the families’ living arrangements by
passing housing or other zoning ordinances.
2. Limits on Fourteenth Amendment Rights
a. Laws Prohibiting Sexual Conduct with Minors Do Not Violate
Constitutional Rights
While the right of adults to engage in private sexual conduct is
protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,166 no
such right exists if adults seek to engage in sexual conduct with minors.

158. Id. at 499.
159. Id. at 501.
160. Id. at 503.
161. Id. at 504.
162. Id. at 505–06.
163. Id. at 500.
164. Id. at 506.
165. In re Steed, No. 03-08-00235-CV, 2008 WL 2132014, at *2 (Tex. App. May 22, 2008) (per
curiam).
166. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
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According to section 21.11 of the Texas Penal Code, “[a] person
commits an offense if, with a child younger than 17 years of age,
whether the child is of the same or opposite sex, the person engages in
sexual contact with the child or causes the child to engage in sexual
contact.”167 While this section only makes sexual contact a crime if the
victim is not the perpetrator’s spouse,168 in Texas a person must be
sixteen years old in order to marry.169 Persons over sixteen but less than
eighteen years of age must have parental consent in order to get
married.170 It is a third degree felony for a person to “knowingly
provide[] parental consent . . . for an applicant who is younger than 16
years of age or who is presently married to a person other than the person
the applicant desires to marry.”171 Finally, while common law or
“informal” marriages are recognized in Texas,172 persons under eighteen
years of age may not be a party to an informal marriage.173
Among other accusations, adult male residents of the YFZ Ranch
were alleged to have impregnated girls under the age of sixteen.174 Such
sexual contact with the girls would qualify as indecency with a child,
even if the contact was consensual.175 The accused men might try to
argue that they are not guilty of any crime because they were married to
the girls.176 However, because Texas law prohibits marriage of girls that
young, any “marriage” involving the girls would be void. Consequently,
the exception for spouses would be inapplicable.

167. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.11(a)(1) (Vernon 2003). The section includes an affirmative
defense for actors not more than three years older than the victim, who do not use duress, force, or a
threat against the victim, who are not required to register as sex offenders, and have not had a
reportable conviction or adjudication under this section. Id. § 21.11(b).
168. Id. § 21.11(b-1).
169. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 2.102 (Vernon 2006).
170. Id. § 2.102(a).
171. Id. § 2.102(h).
172. Id. § 2.401.
173. Id. § 2.401(c)(1). This section was amended in 1997 to add a minimum age requirement of
eighteen for informal marriages. See Kingery v. Hintz, 124 S.W.3d 875, 877 n.2 (Tex. App. 2003)
(noting that the purpose of the amendment was “to eliminate common-law marriage as a defense to
statutory rape”).
174. Dan Frosch, Texas Report Says 12 Girls at Sect Ranch Were Married, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24,
2008, at A17.
175. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.11(a) (Vernon 2003).
176. See Frosch, supra note 174 (stating that the underage girls were “spiritually” married to
older men).
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b. Polygamy is Illegal in Every State
Polygamy is illegal in Texas177 and every other state.178 The
Supreme Court rejected challenges to laws against polygamy on
constitutional grounds as early as the late nineteenth century.179 The
history of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints and the State
of Utah has been central to the legal debate about polygamy. In 1890,
The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints—which had previously
endorsed plural marriages—banned the practice.180 This was apparently
done in an attempt to gain statehood for the territory of Utah.181 In 1894,
Congress passed the Utah Enabling Act, which required Utah to enact an
“irrevocable” law protecting freedom of religion but forever banning
polygamy or plural marriages.182 Utah complied, was made a state, and
included the following provision in its constitution:
The following ordinance shall be irrevocable without the consent of the
United States and the people of this State:
First: Perfect toleration of religious sentiment is guaranteed. No
inhabitant of this State shall ever be molested in person or property on
account of his or her mode of religious worship; but polygamous or
plural marriages are forever prohibited.183

177. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 25.01(a) (Vernon 2005):
(a) An individual commits an offense if:
(1) he is legally married and he:
(A) purports to marry or does marry a person other than his spouse in this state, or any
other state or foreign country, under circumstances that would, but for the actor’s prior
marriage, constitute a marriage; or
(B) lives with a person other than his spouse in this state under the appearance of being
married; or
(2) he knows that a married person other than his spouse is married and he:
(A) purports to marry or does marry that person in this state, or any other state or foreign
country, under circumstances that would, but for the person’s prior marriage, constitute a
marriage; or
(B) lives with that person in this state under the appearance of being married.
An offense under this section is a third degree felony. Id. § 25.01(e).
178. Edward Stein, Past and Present Proposed Amendments to the United States Constitution
Regarding Marriage, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 611, 634 (2004) (citing HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF
DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 64–65 (2d ed. 1988)).
179. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166 (1878).
180. Bronson v. Swensen, 500 F.3d 1099, 1103 n.3 (10th Cir. 2007).
181. Brigham Daniels, Revitalizing Zion: Nineteenth-Century Mormonism and Today’s Urban
Sprawl, 28 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 257, 277 (2008).
182. Bronson, 500 F.3d at 1102.
183. UTAH CONST. art. III, § 1.
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Because of the ban on polygamy, some members of The Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter-day Saints split from the church and became known as
the FLDS Church.184 Members of the FLDS Church believe in and
practice polygamy.185 Many have challenged laws prohibiting plural
marriages, arguing that such laws are unconstitutional.186
The Supreme Court first rejected that argument in Reynolds v. United
States.187 The Court first concluded that a federal statute prohibiting
bigamy was within the legislative power of Congress.188 Moreover, it
held that the statute was constitutional and valid even as applied to
individuals whose religion advocated plural marriages.189 Excusing
violations of the law because the religious beliefs of the perpetrator were
contrary to the law “would be to make the professed doctrines of
religious belief superior to the law of the land, and in effect to permit
every citizen to become a law unto himself.”190 Later challenges have
also failed.191
In Texas, not only is it a crime for a married person to marry another,
it is also a crime for a married person to “live[] with a person other than
his spouse . . . under the appearance of being married.”192 Thus, even if a
man was legally married to one of the women, he could not legally be
married to any other woman, nor could he live with another woman
under the appearance of being married. This could be troubling for YFZ
residents who did not legally marry but who live with more than one
woman under the appearance of marriage.
D. Fourth Amendment Protection from Unreasonable Search and
Seizure
The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides: “The right
of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
184. JESSOP & PALMER, supra note 5, at 18.
185. Id.
186. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166 (1878).
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 167.
191. See, e.g., Potter v. Murray City, 760 F.2d 1065, 1068 (10th Cir. 1985) (“Plaintiff argues that
Reynolds is no longer controlling because later cases have ‘in effect’ overturned the decision. We
disagree.”).
192. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 25.01(a)(1)(B) (Vernon 2005). Under prior law, the crime of
bigamy could be based upon a common-law marriage. Stevens v. State, 243 S.W.2d 162, 162–63
(Tex. Crim. App. 1951) (holding that crime of bigamy could be predicated upon a common-law
marriage despite the fact that the second marriage was void as a matter of law).
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against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated . . . .”193
The Fourth Amendment has been held to protect subjective expectations
of privacy if society is prepared to recognize those expectations as
reasonable.194 People are presumed to have an expectation of privacy in
their homes, and courts have consistently protected that expectation.195
“With few exceptions, the question whether a warrantless search of a
home is reasonable and hence constitutional must be answered no.”196
Consequently, in most instances, in order for government officials to
conduct a search of a person’s home, the officials must obtain a warrant
from a neutral magistrate supported by probable cause to believe that a
crime has been or is being committed.197 However, warrantless searches
may be reasonable if exigent circumstances exist that render the search
reasonable.198
In the case of the YFZ Ranch, government officials could not
arbitrarily enter onto the property or search the buildings, particularly the
dwellings, without violating the Fourth Amendment. The physical
barriers surrounding the property and the physical isolation from other
dwellings provided further protection, since the activities of the residents
were shielded from the “plain view” of non-residents.199 If government
officials did receive evidence that provided probable cause of a crime,
then a warrant could be issued and a search conducted in accordance
with that warrant would not violate the Fourth Amendment.
Furthermore, police may enter and search a home without a warrant
in order to render emergency aid or to protect an occupant from
imminent harm;200 these would qualify as exigent circumstances that
would obviate the need for a warrant.201 Consequently, government
officials would be able to intervene and search the YFZ Ranch without a

193. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
194. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
195. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31 (2001) (“‘At the very core’ of the Fourth
Amendment ‘stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from
unreasonable governmental intrusion.’” (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511
(1961))).
196. Id.
197. See, e.g., Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987) (noting that searches of homes
usually require a warrant supported by probable cause).
198. Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006).
199. The Supreme Court has held that visual observation of a home is not a search at all, thus the
Fourth Amendment does not apply. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 32. “The Fourth Amendment protection of
the home has never been extended to require law enforcement officers to shield their eyes when
passing by a home on public thoroughfares.” California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213 (1986).
200. Stuart, 547 U.S. at 403–04.
201. Id.
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warrant if such steps were necessary to protect a resident, particularly a
child, from imminent harm.
E. Ninth Amendment
The Ninth Amendment states: “The enumeration in the Constitution,
of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others
retained by the people.”202 Some courts and scholars have identified the
Ninth Amendment as a constitutional source of parental rights.203 The
United States Supreme Court has recognized the integrity of the family
as a fundamental right protected by the Ninth Amendment,204 and
according to the Utah Supreme Court: “The rights inherent in family
relationships—husband-wife, parent-child, and sibling—are the most
obvious examples of rights retained by the people. They are ‘natural,’
‘intrinsic,’ or ‘prior’ in the sense that our Constitutions presuppose them,
as they presuppose the right to own and dispose of property.”205 Despite
these authorities, courts tend to rely on or cite the Ninth Amendment
only in conjunction with other constitutional rights, perhaps because the
precise contours and meaning of the Ninth Amendment have not been as
clearly defined as those of other constitutional provisions.206 Still, at
least with respect to parental rights, the Ninth Amendment provides
another layer of constitutional protection.
IV. PRIVACY PROTECTION CONFERRED BY STATE LAWS
A. State Constitutions That Specifically Include a Right of Privacy That
Protects Against Intrusion by the Government
Many state constitutions include provisions relating to religious and
privacy rights. For example, the Texas Constitution states:
202. U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
203. See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 91 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“In my view,
[the right of parents to direct the upbringing of their children] is among the ‘unalienable
Rights’ . . . .”); In re J.P., 648 P.2d 1364, 1372–74 (Utah 1982) (citing Ninth Amendment as source
of parental rights); Comment, People v. Bennett: Analytic Approaches to Recognizing a
Fundamental Parental Right Under the Ninth Amendment, 1996 BYU L. REV. 183, 189 (1996)
(“[T]here is in fact a single expansive, fundamental right to direct the upbringing of one’s children
protected under the Ninth Amendment.”).
204. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972).
205. In re J.P., 648 P.2d at 1373.
206. See Comment, supra note 203, at 208 (noting the longstanding view that the Ninth
Amendment poses the danger of “judicial freewheeling” and quoting Judge Bork’s statement during
his Senate confirmation hearing that the Ninth Amendment is an “ink blot”).
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All men have a natural and indefeasible right to worship Almighty God
according to the dictates of their own consciences. No man shall be
compelled to attend, erect or support any place of worship, or to
maintain any ministry against his consent. No human authority ought,
in any case whatever, to control or interfere with the rights of
conscience in matters of religion, and no preference shall ever be given
by law to any religious society or mode of worship. But it shall be the
duty of the Legislature to pass such laws as may be necessary to protect
equally every religious denomination in the peaceable enjoyment of its
own mode of public worship.207

This provision grants affirmative rights with respect to religion that go
well beyond any protection afforded by the U.S. Constitution.208
Consequently, the Texas Constitution may provide protection to the YFZ
residents that the U.S. Constitution and federal statutes do not.
The California Constitution includes a specific provision protecting
privacy. Under this provision, “[a]ll people are by nature free and
independent and have inalienable rights. Among these are enjoying and
defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing, and protecting property,
and pursuing and obtaining safety, happiness, and privacy.”209 This
explicit right to privacy has been interpreted by California courts to
encompass greater privacy rights than those found in the U.S.
Constitution.210 In American Academy of Pediatrics v. Lungren, the
California Supreme Court held that a state statute requiring pregnant
minors to secure parental consent or judicial authorization before
obtaining abortions violated the state constitutional right of privacy.211
The Court noted that “not only is the state constitutional right of privacy
embodied in explicit constitutional language not present in the federal
Constitution, but past California cases establish that, in many contexts,
the scope and application of the state constitutional right of privacy is
broader and more protective of privacy than the federal constitutional
right of privacy as interpreted by the federal courts.”212
In contrast, the Pennsylvania Constitution uses language
substantially similar to the U.S. Constitution, yet Pennsylvania courts
have interpreted the Pennsylvania Constitution to provide greater privacy
207. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 6.
208. Waite v. Waite, 64 S.W.3d 217, 228 (Tex. App. 2001) (“The intention of the framers and
ratifiers of the Texas Constitution, as evident in the plain meaning of the words they used, compels
the conclusion that Article I, Section 6 provides broader protection of religious freedom than the
First Amendment.”).
209. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1.
210. See Am. Acad. of Pediatrics v. Lungren, 940 P.2d 797, 808 (Cal. 1997).
211. Id. at 800.
212. Id. at 808.
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rights than the U.S. Constitution.213 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court
has acknowledged broader state privacy rights not recognized in the
federal context by granting automatic standing to assert search and
seizure violations, rejecting the good faith exception to the warrant
requirement, requiring warrants prior to placing pen registers, and
finding that a sniff by a drug-sniffing dog constitutes a search.214
B. State Religious Freedom Restoration Acts
After the United States Supreme Court decided City of Boerne v.
Flores in 1997, holding that the federal Religious Freedom Restoration
Act could not be applied to the states,215 several states, including Texas,
passed similar acts that apply to state law.216 In Texas, the statute states:
(a) Subject to Subsection (b), a government agency may not
substantially burden a person’s free exercise of religion.
(b) Subsection (a) does not apply if the government agency
demonstrates that the application of the burden to the person:
(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and
(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that interest.217

This statute was enacted in 1999 and makes the compelling interest test
applicable to Texas state laws.218 In fact, section 110.001 directs courts
to “give weight to the interpretation of compelling interest in federal case
213. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Jackson, 698 A.2d 571, 573 (Pa. 1997) (“The protection
against unreasonable searches and seizures afforded by the Pennsylvania Constitution is broader than
that under the federal Constitution.”). Similarly, the Utah Constitution uses language that is nearly
identical to the U.S. Constitution, but Utah courts have found that the Utah Constitution offers
greater privacy than its federal counterpart. See, e.g., State v. Thompson, 810 P.2d 415, 417–18
(Utah 1991) (rejecting contrary federal Fourth Amendment precedent to hold that a depositor has a
legitimate expectation of privacy in his bank records).
214. Seth F. Kreimer, The Right to Privacy in the Pennsylvania Constitution, 3 WIDENER J. PUB.
L. 77, 84–85 (1993).
215. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 511 (1997).
216. Connecticut, Idaho, Illinois, Missouri, Oklahoma, and Texas have passed Religious
Freedom Restoration Acts with language similar to the federal statute. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §
52-571b(b) (West 2005); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 73-402 (2006); 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 35/15
(West 2001); MO. ANN. STAT. §§ 1.302, 1.307 (West Supp. 2009); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 51, § 253
(West 2008); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 110.003 (Vernon 2005); Kimberly A. Yuracko,
Education Off the Grid: Constitutional Constraints on Homeschooling, 96 CAL. L. REV. 123, 129
(2008).
217. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 110.003.
218. See id.
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law relating to the free exercise of religion clause of the First
Amendment of the United States Constitution” when deciding whether
the asserted interest is a compelling governmental interest.219 The
Connecticut, Idaho, Illinois, Missouri, and Oklahoma statutes have
similar language.220
C. Statutes Authorizing State Intervention in Family Relationships
1. Taking Possession of Children Without the Consent of a Parent or
Guardian
While the U.S. Constitution protects parents’ rights with respect to
the rearing of their children, those rights are not unlimited. Specifically,
parents have no right to neglect or abuse their children. States are
allowed and even required to intervene to protect children from their
parents if the health, safety, or well-being of the child is in jeopardy.
Thus, while parents are presumed to act in the best interests of their
children and generally cannot be deprived of their right to raise their
children as they see fit, if the government has evidence that the child is in
danger, the state’s interest in protecting the child trumps the parents’
rights.221
In the case of the YFZ children, Texas law prevents state officials
from removing children from the custody of their parent or guardian
except under very specific circumstances in which there is evidence that
the health or safety of the child is in danger.222 In order for a court to
issue an emergency order authorizing the government to take possession
of a child, the court must find: (1) that a child’s physical health or safety
is in immediate danger, or that the child has been neglected or sexually
abused; (2) that leaving the child in the home is contrary to the child’s
welfare; (3) there is no time for a full adversary hearing; and (4)
reasonable efforts have been made, consistent with the circumstances and

219. Id. § 110.001.
220. Yuracko, supra note 216, at 129.
221. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166–67 (1944) (“But the family itself is not
beyond regulation in the public interest, as against a claim of religious liberty. And neither rights of
religion nor rights of parenthood are beyond limitation. . . . The right to practice religion freely does
not include liberty to expose the community or the child to communicable disease or the latter to ill
health or death.” (citations omitted)).
222. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 262.001 (Vernon 2002). Chapter 262 of the Texas Family
Code is titled “Procedures in Suit by Governmental Entity to Protect Health and Safety of Child.”
See id.
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the safety of the child, to prevent or eliminate the need to remove the
child from the home.223
A representative of the Department of Family and Protective
Services, a law enforcement officer, or a juvenile probation officer may
take possession of a child without a court order only if there is no time to
obtain an order and the official has “personal knowledge of facts that
would lead a person of ordinary prudence and caution to believe that
there is an immediate danger to the physical health or safety of the
child,” to believe that the child has been a victim of sexual abuse, or to
believe that the person with possession of the child is using a controlled
substance and the use constitutes an immediate danger to the physical
health or safety of the child.224
2. Terminating the Parent-Child Relationship
States also have authority to terminate the relationship between
parents and their children, but only in the most extreme circumstances.225

223. Id. § 262.102(a).
224. Id. § 262.104. The full text of the section reads as follows:
Taking Possession of a Child in Emergency Without a Court Order
(a) If there is no time to obtain a temporary restraining order or attachment before taking
possession of a child consistent with the health and safety of that child, an authorized
representative of the Department of Family and Protective Services, a law enforcement
officer, or a juvenile probation officer may take possession of a child without a court
order under the following conditions, only:
(1) on personal knowledge of facts that would lead a person of ordinary prudence and
caution to believe that there is an immediate danger to the physical health or safety of the
child;
(2) on information furnished by another that has been corroborated by personal
knowledge of facts and all of which taken together would lead a person of ordinary
prudence and caution to believe that there is an immediate danger to the physical health
or safety of the child;
(3) on personal knowledge of facts that would lead a person of ordinary prudence and
caution to believe that the child has been the victim of sexual abuse;
(4) on information furnished by another that has been corroborated by personal
knowledge of facts and all of which taken together would lead a person of ordinary
prudence and caution to believe that the child has been the victim of sexual abuse; or
(5) on information furnished by another that has been corroborated by personal
knowledge of facts and all of which taken together would lead a person of ordinary
prudence and caution to believe that the parent or person who has possession of the child
is currently using a controlled substance as defined by Chapter 481, Health and Safety
Code, and the use constitutes an immediate danger to the physical health or safety of the
child.
Id. § 262.104(a).
225. E.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 747–48 (1982).
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The fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the care, custody,
and management of their child does not evaporate simply because they
have not been model parents or have lost temporary custody of their
child to the State. Even when blood relationships are strained, parents
retain a vital interest in preventing the irretrievable destruction of their
family life. If anything, persons faced with forced dissolution of their
parental rights have a more critical need for procedural protections than
do those resisting state intervention into ongoing family affairs. When
the State moves to destroy weakened familial bonds, it must provide
the parents with fundamentally fair procedures.226

Before a state can irrevocably terminate a person’s parental rights, the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution requires that the state prove its allegations of abuse or
neglect with clear and convincing evidence.227 The Texas statute
providing for termination of the parent-child relationship adopts the clear
and convincing standard and allows for termination of parental rights
only if the state can prove that the parent is guilty of one of the
enumerated instances of abuse or neglect and that termination is in the
best interests of the child.228 In cases in which the state seeks to
terminate parental rights, indigent parents have the right to have counsel
appointed to represent them in all critical stages of the proceedings.229
D. Tort Laws Protecting Against Intrusion by Private Individuals
1. Privacy Torts
The Restatement (Second) of Torts recognizes four different claims
for invasion of privacy: (1) intrusion upon seclusion; (2) appropriation of
name or likeness; (3) publicity given to private life; and (4) publicity

226. Id. at 753–54.
227. Id. at 747–48.
228. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001 (Vernon 2008). The statute authorizes the court to
terminate the parent-child relationship if it finds clear and convincing evidence of abuse, neglect, or
endangerment, including voluntarily leaving the child alone, endangering the physical or emotional
well-being of the child, causing the failure of the child to be enrolled in school, or abandonment of
the child. Id. The relationship can also be terminated if the parent engages in criminal conduct
resulting in conviction and incarceration, if the parent causes the child to be born addicted to alcohol
or a controlled substance, or is convicted of the murder of the child’s other parent or of another
child. Id. In all cases, the court must find that termination of the parent-child relationship is in the
best interests of the child. Id.
229. Id. § 107.013(a)(1); see also In re M.S., 115 S.W.3d 534, 544 (Tex. 2003) (holding that the
statutory right to counsel in parental rights cases embodies the right to effective assistance of
counsel).
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placing person in false light.230 The intrusion tort allows recovery
against one who intentionally intrudes “upon the solitude or seclusion of
another or his private affairs or concerns . . . if the intrusion would be
highly offensive to a reasonable person.”231 A person commits the tort of
appropriation if he “appropriates to his own use or benefit the name or
likeness of another.”232 Additionally, a person is subject to liability if
that person publicized private information about another and “the matter
publicized is of a kind that (a) would be highly offensive to a reasonable
person, and (b) is not of legitimate concern to the public.”233 Finally:
One who gives publicity to a matter concerning another that places the
other before the public in a false light is subject to liability to the other
for invasion of his privacy, if (a) the false light in which the other was
placed would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and (b) the
actor had knowledge of or acted in reckless disregard as to the falsity of
the publicized matter and the false light in which the other would be
placed.234

Not all states recognize all four invasion of privacy claims, and the
elements of each claim may vary by jurisdiction. Texas recognizes only
three types of invasion of privacy: intrusion upon seclusion, public
disclosure of private facts, and wrongful appropriation of name or
likeness.235
2. Trespass
In Texas, trespass can be a crime and a tort. Criminal trespass
requires proof that “(1) a person, (2) without effective consent, (3) enters
or remains on the property or in a building of another, (4) knowingly,
intentionally, or recklessly, (5) when he had notice that entry was
forbidden or received notice to depart and failed to do so.”236 The tort of
trespass can be established merely by proving an unauthorized entry onto
property.237 “A trespass can be either by entry of a person on another’s
land or by causing or permitting a thing to cross the boundary of the
230. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 652B–E (1977).
231. Id. § 652B.
232. Id. § 652C.
233. Id. § 652D.
234. Id. § 652E.
235. Tex. Comptroller of Pub. Accounts v. Attorney Gen. of Tex., 244 S.W.3d 629, 635 (Tex.
App. 2008).
236. Bader v. State, 15 S.W.3d 599, 606 (Tex. App. 2000).
237. Aguilar v. Trujillo, 162 S.W.3d 839, 851 (Tex. App. 2005).
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premises. Finally, a trespass may be committed on, beneath, or above
the surface of the earth.”238 Laws against trespass allow the YFZ
residents to prevent private citizens as well as government officials from
entering onto their property without permission. This contributes to the
isolation of the residents and prevents contact with those in the larger
community.
V. CONGRESS’S RESPONSE
A. Bill Introduced by Senator Harry Reid: “To establish a Federal
Polygamy Task Force, to authorize assistance for victims of
polygamy, and for other purposes”239
On July 23, 2008, Senator Harry Reid of Nevada introduced the
“Victims of Polygamy Assistance Act of 2008.”240 The bill included the
following findings: large polygamist communities exist in Arizona, Utah,
and Nevada and are expanding into other states; the polygamous
communities are controlled by organizations that “engage in widespread
and systematic violations” of state and federal laws; those crimes include
child abuse, domestic violence, welfare fraud, tax evasion, public
corruption, witness tampering, and transporting victims across state lines;
and state and local law enforcement would benefit from the assistance of
the federal government, including enhanced collaboration and
information-sharing among state and federal agencies.241 Moreover, the
bill included a finding that polygamist organizations “isolate, control,
manipulate, and threaten victims with retribution should they ever
abandon the organization.”242 Consequently, victims of polygamist
organizations have unique social service needs warranting federal
assistance.243
The bill provided for the establishment of a Federal Polygamy Task
Force within the Department of Justice, which would coordinate federal
efforts and collaborate with state officials “in the investigation and
prosecution of criminal activities of polygamist organizations in both
Federal and State Courts.”244 The Task Force would “consist of the
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.

Id. (citations omitted).
Victims of Polygamy Assistance Act of 2008, S. 3313, 110th Cong.
Id. § 1.
Id. § 2.
Id.
Id.
Id. §§ 2–3.
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Deputy Attorney General, the United States attorneys from affected
Federal judicial districts, representatives of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, the Internal Revenue Service, the Department of Labor,
and the Department of Health and Human Services,” and any other
federal government officer that the Deputy Attorney General considers
necessary to achieve the goals of the Task Force.245 The purposes of the
Task Force are to:
(1) formulate effective responses to the unique set of crimes
committed by polygamist organizations;
(2) establish partnerships with State and local law enforcement
agencies to share relevant information and strengthen State and Federal
efforts to combat crimes perpetrated by polygamist organizations;
(3) assist States by providing strategies and support for the
protection of witnesses;
(4) track the criminal behavior of polygamist organizations that
cross State and international borders; and
(5) ensure that local officials charged with protecting the public are
not corrupted because of financial, family, or membership ties to a
polygamist organization.246

The bill would also amend the Victims of Crime Act of 1984 by
empowering the Director to make grants to develop and maintain
programs for enforcing the rights of and providing social services for
individuals victimized by polygamists.247 The bill provided that funds in
the amount of $2 million for fiscal year 2009 and $2.5 million for the
next four fiscal years would be appropriated to carry out these goals.248
Finally, the bill would amend the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act of 1968 to grant $2 million from the Attorney General to
state and local governments to investigate and prosecute polygamist
organizations.249

245.
246.
247.
248.
249.

Id. § 3(a).
Id. § 3(b).
Id. § 4.
Id.
Id. § 5.
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B. Senate Committee Hearing on “Crimes Associated with Polygamy:
The Need for a Coordinated State and Federal Response”
The Victims of Polygamy Assistance Act of 2008 was referred to the
Senate Judiciary Committee and on July 24, 2008, the Committee held a
hearing on “Crimes Associated with Polygamy: The Need for a
Coordinated State and Federal Response.”250 Those testifying included
the bill’s sponsor, Senator Harry Reid; Gregory A. Brower, United States
Attorney for the District of Nevada; Brett Tolman, United States
Attorney for the District of Utah; Terry Goddard, Arizona Attorney
General; Greg Abbott, Texas Attorney General; Stephen Singular,
investigative journalist and author of non-fiction books; Daniel Fischer,
dentist and former member of the FLDS Church; and Carolyn Jessop,
former member of the FLDS Church and former wife of Merril Jessop,
whom she alleged runs the YFZ Ranch.251
Carolyn Jessop testified before Congress about her “firsthand
experiences of the systematic abuse and the disregard for the law within
the FLDS which leads to the isolation of its most vulnerable individuals
within any community—women and children, who live without the
protection of laws that most Americans take for granted.”252 Jessop
escaped from the community in 2003 with her eight children, and she coauthored a book about her life in the community and her escape from
it.253 In her testimony, Jessop noted that the community’s cruel practices
and disregard for the law lead to the isolation of women and children.254
Jessop condemned local law enforcement, nearly all of whom were
FLDS members, for their indifference to domestic abuse and child labor
law violations.255 Even though Jessop managed to escape, she expressed
the apprehension she had felt at contacting government service agencies
because she feared the legal consequences of being a former member of a
polygamous community.256 Once Jessop did seek help, she found she did
not qualify for the assistance she needed.257 According to Jessop, women
leaving FLDS communities need physical, psychological, and emotional
250. Crimes Associated with Polygamy: The Need for a Coordinated State and Federal
Response: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. I (2008) [hereinafter
Hearing].
251. Id. at III.
252. Id. at 29 (statement of Carolyn Jessop, West Jordan, Utah).
253. See JESSOP & PALMER, supra note 5.
254. Hearing, supra note 250, at 29 (statement of Carolyn Jessop, West Jordan, Utah).
255. Id. at 29–30.
256. Id. at 30.
257. Id. at 31.
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support, and she argued that the federal government needs to provide
safe havens outside FLDS communities to support women who wish to
leave in addition to ensuring that state and federal laws are enforced in
FLDS communities.258
Stephen Singular is an investigative journalist and nonfiction writer
who had been studying Warren Jeffs and the FLDS Church since 2006,
and he focused his prepared statement on tracing Jeffs’s abusive
practices and disregard for the legal system.259 According to Singular,
Jeffs has ignored child labor laws, laws prohibiting minors to cross state
lines for sexual purposes, and laws against bigamy and underage
marriage.260 Singular’s testimony indicated that women and girls were
not Jeffs’s only victims.261 Singular claimed that Jeffs regularly expelled
rebellious young men out into the streets and failed to address genetic
disorders caused by the community’s inbreeding.262 Singular noted that
sympathetic local law enforcement and hidden financial reserves helped
Jeffs and the FLDS Church continue this criminal lifestyle, and Singular
asserted that an investigation by those with subpoena power in
conjunction with cooperative former FLDS members was the only way
to know the full extent of the FLDS Church’s crimes.263
Daniel Fischer, a former member of the FLDS Church and the cofounder of an organization to help expelled FLDS youth, testified as to
his experience with the community.264 Fischer noted that FLDS
members feel persecuted, that they are willing to sacrifice themselves
and their families if their leader so directs, and that marriage and families
are completely controlled by FLDS leadership.265 Fischer emphasized
the damage to children and families caused by Jeffs’s expulsion of men
from the community and Jeffs’s subsequent orders to their wives to
remarry.266 Fischer urged Congress to take action to protect children
from the illegal actions of the FLDS Church.267
Terry Goddard, the current Arizona Attorney General, submitted a
written statement, which he summarized in his testimony before the

258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.

Id.
Id. at 24–26 (statement of Stephen Singular, Denver, Colorado).
Id. at 24–25.
Id. at 25.
Id.
Id. at 26.
Id. (statement of Daniel Fischer, Sandy, Utah).
Id. at 27.
Id. at 27–28.
Id. at 29.
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committee.268 In his statement, Goddard observed the public backlash
created by early Arizona law enforcement raids on the fledgling FLDS
Church community.269 As a result, law enforcement began to ignore
these communities, residents became suspicious of law enforcement, and
the leaders of the communities assumed more control over their
followers.270 In 2003, to combat these effects, Goddard and Utah
Attorney General Mark Shurtleff formed a partnership to coordinate civil
and criminal investigations and offer services for victims of child and
domestic abuse.271 Goddard noted that these services, provided under the
umbrella of the Safety Net Program, now include assistance from law
enforcement agencies, local service agencies, advocacy groups, and
members of the community.272
According to Goddard, one of this initiative’s most significant
accomplishments was the indictment of Warren Jeffs on child abuse
charges in Arizona and Utah.273 Goddard noted that problems with law
enforcement in the current FLDS Church communities of Colorado City
and Hildale stem from local officer allegiance to Jeffs and Goddard’s
Office’s limited state civil rights jurisdiction.274 Goddard suggested that
the federal government or county sheriffs might easily assert authority
over civil rights violations in FLDS Church communities, and he noted
that coordination among local, state, and federal law enforcement
agencies would be crucial to prosecute multi-jurisdictional crimes.275
Finally, Goddard mentioned that the closing of FLDS Church private
schools following Jeffs’s arrest and Jeffs’s subsequent order forbidding

268. Id. at 11–12 (statement of Terry Goddard, Att’y Gen., State of Arizona).
269. Id. at 12.
270. Id. As Mr. Goddard put it:
I have been intent on not repeating the heavy-handed mistakes of the past. Arizona badly
executed a police raid in 1953 known as the “Short Creek raid” that took most of the
children in the community into custody and made them wards of the State. And it had
three long-term negative effects:
First, afterwards, governmental authorities were reluctant to do anything, to pay any
attention to the area of Short Creek, soon renamed Colorado City, and Hildale in Utah.
Second, the residents of these communities became highly suspicious of Government
at all levels. We found that victims of abuse feared the State more than their abuser.
And, third, the leaders of the FLDS Church used the first two to increase their
autocratic authority over their followers.
Id. The unfortunate similarities between the Short Creek raid and the raid on the YFZ Ranch are
readily apparent.
271. Id.
272. Id. at 12–13.
273. Id. at 81 (written statement of Terry Goddard, Att’y Gen., State of Arizona).
274. Id.
275. Id.
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FLDS parents from enrolling their children in public schools were of
particular concern.276 He noted that few parents had filed homeschooling affidavits and that there were reports that children were being
sent to work.277 Nonetheless, Goddard asserted that the Safety Net
agencies were providing “legal assistance, housing, counseling,
education and other support to victims in need.”278 Goddard mentioned
other successes the Utah-Arizona partnership had achieved, including the
development of a training curriculum to help professionals provide
services to victims in polygamous communities, the establishment of a
twenty-four-hour, toll-free helpline for victims, the passage of child
bigamy statutes in Arizona and Utah, and the organization of town hall
meetings to allow members of Colorado City and Hildale to converse
with law enforcement leaders.279
VI. RESULTING OPPRESSION
The laws protecting privacy leave the government unable to
investigate or intervene without credible evidence that the law has been
violated.280 Because the perpetrators are not likely to supply that
information, the crime may go undetected and unpunished unless the
victim or a third party does so. Yet there are many reasons why neither
victims nor third parties will give the government the information
necessary to allow intervention.
One reason is isolation. Those who are physically separated from
the larger community may be unable to contact help when needed.
Moreover, if the victim is isolated, there may not be any third-party
witnesses who can intervene or call the authorities on the victim’s
behalf.281 A second obstacle is ignorance. Those who are unaware that
they have rights that are being violated may not seek help. This may be
the case because of isolation; if a person has lived all of his or her life in
an isolated community, then those beliefs and values may be all that is
known. He or she may have no concept of the rights and laws that
276. Id. at 82.
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. Id. at 82–84.
280. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see discussion supra Part III.D.
281. JESSOP & PALMER, supra note 5, at 13–14. “Our community was so isolated it was rare that
we ever saw anyone from the outside. Most of my cousins only left the community to go shopping
with their mothers and had almost no sense of the outside world.” Id. “Even if a family knew there
was severe abuse going on in another family, no one intervened. This was part of the religious
doctrine that said no man had the right to interfere with another man’s family.” Id. at 37.
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protect them or that behavior they have always accepted is illegal.282 For
immigrants, language barriers may leave them without an understanding
of law or resources available to help.283 If their legal status is an issue,
they may be afraid to report abuse for fear of being imprisoned or
deported.284 Moreover, their abuser may have control over their legal
status.
Age may also play a role. The very young and very old may be
unable to voice opposition, seek help, or even recognize abuse when it
occurs. With respect to children, parents are empowered by law to make
decisions that affect the future of their children. With respect to the
elderly, they may be completely dependent upon others for their care and
may be unable or unwilling to risk the consequences of angering or
pressing charges against a caregiver, especially if the caregiver is a child
or other relative.285
VII.STRIKING THE RIGHT BALANCE
A. Laws Respecting Privacy Limit a Government’s Ability to Protect Its
Citizens
Laws designed to protect citizens are limited in the sense that they
require some evidence that illegal activity has occurred, is occurring, or
will occur. Government officials are not authorized to monitor or
interfere based solely on suspicion or disapproval of the lifestyle or
beliefs of individuals. The Constitution, supplemented by state laws,
gives people, particularly parents, the right to isolate themselves or live
within an isolated community, thereby depriving outsiders or law
enforcement of the opportunity to observe anything that would justify
investigation or intervention. These privacy rights effectively ensure that
some abuse, neglect, and oppression will go undetected and unpunished.
While it is possible to provide greater protection to children and
other vulnerable populations, the protection would necessarily come at
282. “Violence toward children was incorporated into our belief system, and it was very
common in the community to see a mother slap one of her children, sometimes very hard.” Id. at
19–20. “We were taught that the government (which was wicked) would move into our community
and try to kill every man, woman, and child.” Id. at 24.
283. See Leslye E. Orloff et al., Battered Immigrant Women’s Willingness to Call for Help and
Police Response, 13 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 43, 46 (2003).
284. Id. at 47.
285. Mary Twomey et al., From Behind Closed Doors: Shedding Light on Elder Abuse and
Domestic Violence in Late Life, 6 J. CENTER FOR FAMS., CHILD. & CTS. 73, 75 (2005) (“Ninety
percent of all elder abuse is perpetrated by family members.”).
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the expense of privacy. Indeed, many scholars, particularly feminists
and child advocates, have criticized modern notions of family privacy
that “can conceal, even foster, situations dangerous to the individuals
who comprise the family unit.”286 Despite these critiques, the right to
privacy, especially within the home and with respect to the rearing of
children, is so deeply ingrained in American culture and is so deeply
cherished by most parents that it is doubtful that many would be willing
to give up those rights even if it meant saving some people from abuse or
neglect.
For many, the rights of parents are not simply a matter of state law,
but of religious beliefs.287 But even if the beliefs are not religiously
based, the right of parents to raise their children without government
interference is longstanding and deeply held and not likely to be easily
eroded. In fact, in recent decades there has been a push to reassert and
fortify parents’ rights.288 In 1995, bills were sponsored in the United
States House of Representatives and Senate with the stated goal of
protecting “the fundamental right of a parent to direct the upbringing of a
child.”289 The bill stated the following findings:
(1) the Supreme Court has regarded the right of parents to direct the
upbringing of their children as a fundamental right implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty within the 14th amendment to the
Constitution of the United States . . . ;

....
(4) some decisions of federal and state courts have treated the right
of parents not as a fundamental right but as a nonfundamental right,
resulting in an improper standard of judicial review being applied to
government conduct that adversely affects parental rights and
prerogatives;

....
286. Martha Albertson Fineman, What Place for Family Privacy?, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
1207, 1216–17 (1999) (arguing that while there is a necessity for privacy with regard to family
formation and functioning, “hidden beneath the cloak of privacy are power imbalances, perhaps even
incentives for the strong to prey upon or exploit the weak. . . . Therefore, the obvious goal should be
to reconcile both concerns and balance family privacy with protection for family members.”); see
also generally FINEMAN & MYKITIUK, supra note 1, at 3 (exploring “what it has meant to develop
theory and practice around ‘the battered woman,’ ‘the rape victim,’ and ‘the cycle of violence’”).
287. Woodhouse, supra note 1, at 401 (referencing “traditional theory of parents’ rights as God
given or natural rights”).
288. See generally id. at 396–97 (examining proposed federal Parental Rights and
Responsibilities Act of 1995).
289. Id. at 424 app. A.
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(6) governments should not interfere in the decisions and actions of
parents without compelling justification . . . .290

The bill would have prohibited government interference with a parent’s
right to direct the upbringing of his or her child unless “the interference
or usurpation is essential to accomplish a compelling governmental
interest and is narrowly drawn or applied in a manner that is the least
restrictive means of accomplishing the compelling interest.”291 Although
neither the House nor Senate bill ever became law, their proposals
indicate the continuing importance parental rights have in American
society. Moreover, according to the bills’ supporters, similar legislation
was proposed in half of the states.292
B. Methods to Encourage Limited Interaction with Governmental
Officials Without Violating Privacy Rights
If it is true that Americans are unwilling to have their privacy rights
curtailed or eliminated, then solutions must be explored that respect
privacy rights. The Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable
search and seizure makes it difficult for anyone else to observe
suspicious circumstances or behavior that would alert government
officials to a potentially abusive or unhealthy situation. If people are
physically isolated and limit or avoid contact with those outside of their
home or community, then there may be no way for anyone to give the
government sufficient reason to investigate, much less invade private
property to determine whether laws have been broken or the rights of a
resident have been violated. Overcoming these obstacles without
infringing upon privacy rights is challenging but not impossible.
1. Interaction with Children Through the Education System
One means of preventing oppression without violating the privacy of
individuals is by ensuring some face-to-face interaction between
government agents and private citizens, particularly children. One such
interaction could take place in connection with compulsory education
requirements. Every state constitution includes language requiring the
state to establish and maintain a system of free public education.293
290.
291.
292.
293.

Parental Rights and Responsibilities Act of 1995, H.R. 1946, 104th Cong. § 2.
Id. § 5.
Woodhouse, supra note 1, at 399.
Yuracko, supra note 216, at 135.
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Children in public schools have a great deal of interaction with the
government because teachers and administrators are all government
employees. These employees are required by law to keep detailed
records about the progress of each child and notify law enforcement if
abuse or neglect is suspected.294
The right to have a child educated in a private school is protected by
the U.S. Constitution.295 These schools provide a greater degree of
isolation and privacy than public schools, but states have the right to
oversee the curriculum in such schools.296 Moreover, there may be at
least some interaction with children outside of the child’s immediate
family, although, the school may be comprised of children from families
with the same beliefs and thereby still be relatively isolated from the
larger community. Additionally, there may be little regulation of private
schools.297 However, teachers and other private school employees may
be required by law to report suspected child abuse or neglect.298
The children most likely to be completely isolated are those who are
taught at home. Every state allows home schooling, although the degree
of regulation of home-school programs varies widely.299 In states such as
Texas, students are allowed to be home schooled if the parent or
guardian asserts that they are pursuing, in a bona fide (good faith, not
sham or subterfuge) manner, a curriculum designed to meet the basic
goals of reading, spelling, grammar, mathematics, and a study of good
citizenship.300 The statute does not provide for any evaluation or
294. “All fifty states and the District of Columbia have child abuse laws in place that require
certain persons to report suspected child abuse. Those held accountable include school teachers,
school employees, and school authorities.” Jason P. Nance & Philip T.K. Daniel, Protecting
Students From Abuse: Public School District Liability for Student Sexual Abuse Under State Child
Abuse Reporting Laws, 36 J.L. & EDUC. 33, 35 (2007).
295. Pierce v. Soc’y of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus & Mary, 268 U.S. 510, 534–35
(1925).
296. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 402 (1923).
297. For example, Pennsylvania gives private schools the option of being licensed but does not
require licensure. 24 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6705 (West 2006). If a private school chooses to be
licensed, it must permit the school board and its representatives to “inspect the school or classes and
make[] available to the board, at any time when requested to do so, full information pertaining to the
operation of the school.” Id. § 6712. If licensure is not sought, the board does not appear to have
the authority to conduct such inspections. See id. Similarly, Utah has regulations governing when a
private school may enroll a scholarship student, but no other regulations targeting private schools.
UTAH CODE ANN. § 53A-1a-805 (West Supp. 2009).
298. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 11165–11166 (stating that teachers and teacher’s aides in
public and private schools have a duty to report suspected child abuse or neglect); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 53A-6-502 (West 2004) (defining “educators” to include private school teachers, employees, and
volunteers, and requiring such educators to report suspected physical or sexual abuse).
299. Yuracko, supra note 216, at 124.
300. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 25.086 (Vernon Supp. 2009); Tex. Educ. Agency v. Leeper, 893
S.W.2d 432, 439 (Tex. 1944).
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confirmation of the home-school curriculum or the progress of students
being home schooled.301 However, the Texas Supreme Court noted:
[T]he TEA [(Texas Education Agency)] is not precluded from
requesting evidence of achievement test results in determining whether
children are being taught in a bona fide manner. While administration
of such tests cannot be a prerequisite to exception from the compulsory
attendance law, we do not preclude the TEA from giving this factor
heavy weight.302

However, currently there is neither a mechanism in place to ensure that
whatever curriculum the parents adopt is effective, nor a mandate that the
TEA set guidelines for home-school evaluations. Achievement tests are
not required and, if they are given, there are no guidelines in place
regarding the administration of the tests or consequences if students are
not progressing.
Other states impose much stricter regulations on parents who choose
to home school their children. For example, in Pennsylvania, parents
must file a notarized affidavit stating their intention to commence a
home-education program and that the program complies with the
requirements of the home-education statute by the first of August.303 The
statute also specifies the number of days and hours per year of instruction
that the child must receive and lists the courses that must be taught.304
301. See TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 25.086.
302. Leeper, 893 S.W.2d at 444.
303. 24 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 13-1327.1(b)(1) (West 2006). The affidavit must also include
the name of the person responsible for providing instruction, the name and age of each child in the
home education program, and the address and telephone number of the home education program site.
Id. Moreover, the affidavit must state that required subjects will be taught in English and must
include an outline of proposed education objectives by subject area. Id. Additionally, the parent
must provide evidence that the child has received the required immunizations and has received the
health and medical services required for students of the child’s age or grade level. Id. Finally, the
affidavit must certify that no adult living in the home or having custody of a child in the home
education program has been convicted of certain criminal offenses within the prior five years. Id.
304. Id. § 13-1327.1. The statute reads as follows:
(c) A child who is enrolled in a home education program and whose education is
therefore under the direct supervision of his parent, guardian or other person having legal
custody shall be deemed to have met the requirements of section 1327 if that home
education program provides a minimum of one hundred eighty (180) days of instruction
or nine hundred (900) hours of instruction per year at the elementary level, or nine
hundred ninety (990) hours per year at the secondary level:
(1) At the elementary school level, the following courses shall be taught: English, to
include spelling, reading and writing; arithmetic; science; geography; history of the
United States and Pennsylvania; civics; safety education, including regular and
continuous instruction in the dangers and prevention of fires; health and physiology;
physical education; music; and art.
(2) At the secondary school level, the following courses shall be taught: English, to
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The Pennsylvania statute also provides for significant oversight of
the home-education program and evaluation of the home-educated
child’s progress:
In order to demonstrate that appropriate education is occurring, the
supervisor of the home education program shall provide and maintain
on file the following documentation for each student enrolled in the
home education program:
(1) A portfolio of records and materials. The portfolio shall consist of a
log, made contemporaneously with the instruction, which designates by
title the reading materials used, samples of any writings, worksheets,
workbooks or creative materials used or developed by the student and
in grades three, five and eight results of nationally normed standardized
achievement tests in reading/language arts and mathematics or the
results of Statewide tests administered in these grade levels. . . .
....
(2) An annual written evaluation of the student’s educational progress
as determined by a licensed clinical or school psychologist or a teacher
certified by the Commonwealth or by a nonpublic school teacher or
administrator. . . . The evaluation shall also be based on an interview of
the child and a review of the portfolio required in clause (1) and shall
certify whether or not an appropriate education is occurring. At the
request of the supervisor, persons with other qualifications may
conduct the evaluation with the prior consent of the district of residence
superintendent. In no event shall the evaluator be the supervisor or
their spouse.305

include language, literature, speech and composition; science; geography; social studies,
to include civics, world history, history of the United States and Pennsylvania;
mathematics, to include general mathematics, algebra and geometry; art; music; physical
education; health; and safety education, including regular and continuous instruction in
the dangers and prevention of fires. Such courses of study may include, at the discretion
of the supervisor of the home education program, economics; biology; chemistry; foreign
languages; trigonometry; or other age-appropriate courses as contained in Chapter 5
(Curriculum Requirements) of the State Board of Education.
(d) The following minimum courses in grades nine through twelve are established as a
requirement for graduation in a home education program:
(1) Four years of English.
(2) Three years of mathematics.
(3) Three years of science.
(4) Three years of social studies.
(5) Two years of arts and humanities.
Id. § 13-1327.1(c)–(d).
305. Id. § 13-1327.1(e).
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The documentation described above must be submitted to the school
district superintendent at the end of the public school year.306
If the superintendent reviews the documentation and concludes “that
appropriate education is not taking place for the child in the home
education program,” the superintendent must send a certified letter to the
supervisor of the home-education program stating his or her opinion and
“specifying what aspect or aspects of the documentation are
inadequate.”307 The home-education supervisor has twenty days from
receipt of the letter to submit additional documentation establishing that
the child is receiving an appropriate education.308 If the additional
documentation fails to convince the superintendent that appropriate
education is taking place, the school board will arrange for a hearing to
be conducted by an impartial hearing examiner.309 Under certain
circumstances the hearing examiner may place the child in public school:
If the hearing examiner finds that the documentation does not indicate
that appropriate education is taking place in the home education
program, the home education program for the child shall be out of
compliance with the requirements of [the home education statute], and
the student shall be promptly enrolled in the public school district of
residence or a nonpublic school or a licensed private academic
school.310

Neither the home-education supervisor nor his or her spouse is eligible to
supervise the home education for a child for a period of twelve months
after that child’s home-education program is determined to be out of
compliance with the home-education statute.311
a. Constitutional Challenges to Home-Schooling Statutes that Allow for
or Require Ongoing Evaluation and Oversight of Home-Schooling
Programs
Constitutional challenges to statutes such as Pennsylvania’s
generally have not been successful. In Combs v. Homer-Center School
District, parents alleged that the reporting and review requirements of
Pennsylvania’s compulsory education law violated their religious beliefs
306.
307.
308.
309.
310.
311.

Id. § 13-1327.1(h).
Id. § 13-1327.1(i).
Id. § 13-1327.1(j).
Id. § 13-1327.1(k).
Id. § 13-1327.1(l).
Id. § 13-1327.1(m).
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and their fundamental right to direct the schooling and upbringing of
their children.312 The Third Circuit Court of Appeals refused to review
Pennsylvania’s education law under strict scrutiny and instead applied
rational-basis review to determine that the law’s disclosure and review
requirements rationally furthered legitimate state interests.313 The
parents alternatively claimed that the Supreme Court’s ruling in
Wisconsin v. Yoder314 applied to their claim.315 The court of appeals
distinguished Yoder, noting that the compulsory education requirements
sought to be imposed on the Amish plaintiffs in Yoder threatened their
“entire mode of life,” while here the Pennsylvania requirements did not
pose such a risk.316
Similar challenges in other states have also been defeated. In
Murphy v. Arkansas, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the
constitutionality of the Arkansas Home School Act after a homeschooling couple alleged the Act deprived them of their right to the free
exercise of religion, due process of law, equal protection of the laws, and
privacy and parental liberty.317 The Arkansas Home School Act required
home-schooling parents to notify their local school district and provide
“the name, age, and grade of each student, the core curriculum to be
offered, the schedule of instruction and the qualifications of the person
teaching.”318 The Act also required parents to submit each child to a
standardized achievement test each year, which the parents would choose
from an approved list, and to a minimum performance test when the
child reached age fourteen.319 The court found that the state’s
compelling interest in the education of its children would not be
sufficiently safeguarded by parental testing and progress reporting, that
the Act passed rational basis scrutiny, and that the right of privacy did
not give parents the right to make educational decisions for their children
unfettered by reasonable governmental regulation.320
In Duro v. District Attorney, Second Judicial District of North
Carolina, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals found that North
Carolina’s interest in compulsory education was sufficient to override the

312.
313.
314.
315.
316.
317.
318.
319.
320.

Combs v. Homer-Ctr. Sch. Dist., 540 F.3d 231, 234 (3d Cir. 2008) (per curiam).
Id. at 243.
406 U.S. 205 (1972).
Combs, 540 F.3d at 249.
Id. at 251.
Murphy v. Arkansas, 852 F.2d 1039, 1041 (8th Cir. 1988).
Id. at 1040.
Id.
Id. at 1043–44.
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religious interest claimed by a home-schooling parent.321 In Duro, a
father alleged that his rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments
were infringed by North Carolina’s compulsory school-attendance law
because sending his children to either a public or private school would
violate his religious beliefs.322 The children in Duro were taught at home
by their mother, who had no educational training.323 The district court
applied Yoder to find that the compulsory education law was
unconstitutional as applied to the father.324 The court of appeals
reversed, noting that the Amish community was uniquely situated and
did allow their children to attend public school through eighth grade,
while the Duros were not members of such a community and refused to
permit their children to attend outside schools at all.325 The court found
that the father had not demonstrated that home instruction would
“prepare his children to be self-sufficient participants in our modern
society or enable them to participate intelligently in our political
system,” which the court found was a compelling interest of the state.326
The Riveras were home-schooling parents convicted of failing to
provide an annual home-schooling report to their local school district as
required by Iowa statute.327 The Riveras argued that the reporting
requirement violated their free exercise of religion under the First
Amendment.328 The Iowa Supreme Court disagreed with the Riveras and
affirmed their convictions, finding that “the state’s interest in assuring
quality education for its children was not outweighed by the resulting
burden on the parents’ religious beliefs” and that “no alternative means
to the reporting requirements . . . would adequately serve the state’s
purposes . . . .”329
321. 712 F.2d 96, 96–97 (4th Cir. 1983).
322. Id. at 97.
323. Id.
324. Id.
325. Id. at 98.
326. Id. at 99.
327. State v. Rivera, 497 N.W.2d 878, 879–81 (Iowa 1993).
328. Id. at 879.
329. Id. at 880–81. See also In re Sawyer, 672 P.2d 1093, 1094 Syl. 2 (Kan. 1983)
(“[U]naccredited, unplanned, and unscheduled home instruction with an uncertified teacher does not
satisfy . . . compulsory school attendance law,” and law had rational relationship to legitimate state
purpose of educating its children); Blount v. Dep’t of Educ. & Cultural Servs., 551 A.2d 1377, 1377
(Me. 1988) (“[P]rior approval requirement did not violate parents’ right to free exercise of religion,
and state constitution and Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of U.S. Constitution afforded
parents no additional protection beyond that provided by the First Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution.”); State v. Schmidt, 505 N.E.2d 627, 627 (Ohio 1987) (requirement that parents “seek
approval of local superintendent for their home education program . . . reasonably furthers state’s
interest in education . . . and does not infringe upon free exercise of religion”).
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The Michigan Supreme Court has held that a teacher certification
requirement does not violate parents’ Fourteenth Amendment rights.330
In People v. Bennett, home-schooling parents were convicted of four
counts of violating the compulsory education law.331 The parents argued
that the teaching certification requirement of Michigan’s guidelines
regarding home schooling violated their rights under the Fourteenth
Amendment to direct their children’s education.332 The court held that
the parents did not have a fundamental right to direct their children’s
education free from reasonable regulation, and thus that the parents’
asserted right was not subject to strict scrutiny.333 Under a minimal
scrutiny test, the court found that the parents failed to show that the
certified teaching requirement was unreasonable.334
b. Successful Challenges to Home-Schooling Statutes
Some challenges to home-schooling statutes have been successful.
However, these challenges tend to focus on statutes that are vague or
especially intrusive. Many successful challenges also alleged violations
of state law instead of or in addition to federal law. For example, in
Brunelle v. Lynn Public Schools, the Massachusetts Supreme Court held
that home visits could not be imposed as a condition of approval of
parents’ home-schooling plans.335 Parents proposing to educate their
children at home filed suit against a public school district and district
officials for a declaratory judgment that the requirement for home visits
as a condition of approval of the parents’ home-schooling plans violated
their rights under Massachusetts law and the Massachusetts
Constitution.336 The Massachusetts compulsory education law did not
mandate home visits but “[gave] local school officials discretion to
develop home school approval guidelines.”337 The court noted it had
previously held that home-education proposals could be made subject
only to “essential” and “reasonable” requirements, and it concluded that
home visits were not presumptively essential to Massachusetts’s interest

330.
331.
332.
333.
334.
335.
336.
337.

People v. Bennett, 501 N.W.2d 106, 111–12 (Mich. 1993).
Id. at 108.
Id. at 107–08.
Id. at 111–12.
Id. at 117.
Brunelle v. Lynn Pub. Schs., 702 N.E.2d 1182, 1187 (Mass. 1998).
Id. at 1183–84.
Id. at 1185.
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in education and could not be imposed as a condition of approval of
parents’ plans.338
In some states, the wording of the compulsory education statute was
deemed too vague to be enforceable against parents who home schooled
their children. In State v. Popanz, the defendant was a home-schooling
father convicted of violating Wisconsin’s compulsory school attendance
law.339 The Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the phrase “private
school” in the Wisconsin statute was impermissibly vague and violated
the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and Article I of the
Wisconsin Constitution, as the statute did not define “private school” and
left such determination to the sole discretion of the school attendance
officer of the district.340 Similarly, in Roemhild v. State, the defendants
were home-schooling parents convicted of violating Georgia’s
compulsory attendance law.341 The Georgia Supreme Court held that the
phrase “private school” in the Georgia statute was unconstitutionally
vague because it failed to include a definition of “private school” and left
such determination to the sole discretion of local officials.342
South Carolina has struck down a requirement relating to the
qualifications of home-school instructors. In Lawrence v. South
Carolina State Board of Education, home-schooling parents brought an
action to enjoin enforcement of a South Carolina statute requiring
“parents holding only a high school diploma to pass a basic skills
examination known as the Education Entrance Examination (EEE) in
order to be approved for home schooling.”343 The South Carolina
Supreme Court noted that under Yoder the state has the power to impose
only “reasonable standards” on home-schooling programs available as an
338. Id. at 1184.
339. State v. Popanz, 332 N.W.2d 750, 751–52 (Wis. 1983).
340. Id. at 752, 755.
341. Roemhild v. State, 308 S.E.2d 154, 155–56 (Ga. 1983).
342. Id. at 157. Other states have upheld similarly vague statutes. In Burrow v. State, a father
homeschooling his daughter was convicted of violating Arkansas’s compulsory school attendance
law. Burrow v. State, 669 S.W.2d 441, 442–43 (Ark. 1984). He argued that the statute was
unconstitutionally vague because it required attendance at a “public, private or parochial school” but
did not define “school.” Id. at 443. The Arkansas Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the
language of the statute was “clear enough . . . to put [the defendant] on adequate notice that a course
of home study would not constitute a school within the meaning of the statute.” Id. Likewise, in
State v. Moorhead, home schooling parents in Iowa argued that the compulsory attendance law was
unconstitutionally vague and violated the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. 308
N.W. 2d 60, 61–62 (Iowa 1981). The statute exempted students receiving “equivalent instruction by
a certified teacher elsewhere” from the compulsory education requirement, and the defendants
argued that the statute’s failure to define “equivalent instruction” and “certified teacher” rendered
the statute unconstitutionally vague. Id. at 62–63. The Iowa Supreme Court disagreed, holding that
the statute sufficiently put citizens on notice as to what the statute required. Id. at 64.
343. Lawrence v. S.C. State Bd. of Educ., 412 S.E.2d 394, 394 (S.C. 1991).
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alternative to compulsory school attendance in order to protect homeschoolers’ free exercise of religion.344 Here, the court held that the
procedures used to test home-school instructors did not meet a standard
of reasonableness.345
Similarly, the Michigan Supreme Court struck down a teacher
certification requirement for home-schooling families.346 In People v.
DeJonge, parents objected to the requirement on the grounds that their
religious beliefs prohibited allowing anyone else to teach their
children.347 The DeJonge parents did not meet the teacher certification
requirement, yet at trial, the prosecution never questioned the adequacy
of the DeJonges’ instruction or the education the children received.348
The Michigan Supreme Court ultimately held “that the teacher
certification requirement [was] an unconstitutional violation of the Free
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment as applied to families whose
religious convictions prohibit the use of certified instructors.”349
First, the court noted that a claim that the statute violated the First
Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause in conjunction with a claimed
violation of parents’ right to direct their children’s education demanded
application of strict scrutiny.350 The Michigan Supreme Court articulated
the strict scrutiny test as the “compelling interest” test with five
elements:
(1) whether a defendant’s belief, or conduct motivated by belief, is
sincerely held;

344. Id. at 395.
345. Id. at 396.
346. People v. DeJonge, 501 N.W.2d 127, 129 (Mich. 1993). In DeJonge, homeschooling
parents were convicted of instructing their children without the aid of certified teachers, in violation
of Michigan’s compulsory education law. Id. at 129–30. The Ottawa Circuit Court affirmed their
convictions, and the case was consolidated with another case on appeal. Id. at 130. The court of
appeals affirmed both trial court decisions and reaffirmed their convictions on rehearing. Id. On
October 17, 1990, in lieu of granting leave to appeal, the Michigan Supreme Court remanded the
case to the court of appeals for reconsideration in light of recent United States Supreme Court
precedent. Id. at 131. On remand, the court of appeals again affirmed the defendants’ convictions.
Id.
347. Mark DeJonge testified that Michigan’s requirement that all children be taught by
certified teachers violates their religious beliefs because the family “believes that
scripture . . . teaches that parents are the ones that are responsible to God for the
education of their children. And for us to allow the State to insert [sic] God’s
authority, for us to submit to that would be a sin.”
Id. at 130 n.4.
348. Id. at 130.
349. Id. at 129.
350. Id. at 134. The court further noted that Michigan’s Constitution mandated strict scrutiny
under these circumstances as well. Id. at 134 n.27.
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(2) whether a defendant’s belief, or conduct motivated by belief, is
religious in nature;
(3) whether a state regulation imposes a burden on the exercise of such
belief or conduct;
(4) whether a compelling state interest justifies the burden imposed
upon a defendant’s belief or conduct;
(5) whether there is a less obtrusive form of regulation available to the
state.351

The court held that the first and second elements were met because
the DeJonges’ beliefs were sincerely held and those beliefs were
religiously based.352 The court further held that the teacher certification
statute imposed a burden on the DeJonges’ exercise of their beliefs.353
Thus, the third element was met.354
The final two elements were the most controversial. The state
claimed “a compelling [] interest in ensuring the adequate education of
all children.”355 The court acknowledged this interest, but disagreed that
this interest was at issue in the case:
The state’s interest is not ensuring that the goals of compulsory
education are met, because the state does not contest that the DeJonges
are succeeding at fulfilling such aims. Rather, the state’s interest is
simply the certification requirement of the private school act, not the
general objectives of compulsory education. The interest the state
pursues is the manner of education, not its goals.356

Thus, the proper inquiry was whether this interest in upholding the
teacher certification requirement was a compelling interest and, if so,
whether this interest could be achieved through less obtrusive means.357
The court held that the certification requirement was not a compelling
interest.358 It noted that it was undisputed that the DeJonge children were

351. Id. at 135.
352. Id.
353. Id. at 136–37.
354. Id.
355. Id. at 138.
356. Id. at 139.
357. Id. at 140.
358. Id. “[T]he state in the instant case has failed to provide evidence or testimony that supports
the argument that the certification requirement is essential to the preservation of its asserted
interest.” Id.

0.6.0_DOBBINS FINAL

1/4/2010 10:34:47 AM

PRIVATE OPPRESSION

2010]

465

receiving “more than an adequate education.”359 Moreover, the court
noted that few states retained a certification requirement for home
schools, with more than twenty states repealing their teacher certification
requirements in the prior decade.360
Finally, the court noted that even if the state had stated a compelling
interest, it had not established that the certification requirement was the
least obtrusive means of achieving that interest.361 The court noted that
monitoring or evaluation by the state could ensure that adequate
education is taking place without unduly burdening the DeJonges’
religious freedom.362 The court held that “the teacher certification
requirement is an unconstitutional violation of the Free Exercise Clause
of the First Amendment as applied to families whose religious
convictions prohibit the use of certified instructors.”363
c. Proposals for States with Little or No Oversight of Home-School
Programs
States such as Texas, which currently require no oversight or
evaluation of home-school programs or the progress of children being
home schooled, could require some form of periodic evaluation. If a
parent chooses to administer achievement tests, the state could require
that some governmental official be present during the testing. Other,
more subjective, forms of evaluation could also be employed. For
example, children could be interviewed about what they have learned.
This could be especially appropriate if a child has a learning disability
that would make standardized testing an inaccurate means of evaluating
the child’s progress. Again, the key would be some face-to-face
interaction with a government official who would be able to confirm that
the child is learning and the curriculum is being taught. It also allows the
official to observe and report any obvious signs of abuse or neglect.
If more stringent evaluation requirements had been in place in Texas,
officials might have had a better relationship with the YFZ families, or at
least a better understanding of the identities of the children living on the
Ranch. Additionally, officials might have noted the pregnancies of the
underage girls and thus would have had grounds to investigate and
intervene. Moreover, the curriculum is established by state law and
359.
360.
361.
362.
363.

Id.
Id. at 141.
Id.
Id. at 143.
Id. at 144.
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every state could include civics or government as required subjects in
public, private, and home-school curriculums.364 Including these
subjects as part of the testing or evaluation process would help ensure
that all children graduate with a basic understanding of how the
government works and their basic rights under the law.
These suggestions are not intended to discourage or infringe upon
parents’ rights to educate their children in the manner they deem
appropriate. Instead, it is intended to ensure that the parent’s choice does
not violate the children’s rights. Note that steps should be taken to
ensure that the privacy of the parents is not unduly violated. Obviously,
the rules would not be limited to children of particular religious or
political beliefs. No information need be gathered other than that related
to the educational progress of the student. It is not intended to be a
covert investigation (search or seizure) but merely one way to ensure
compliance with compulsory education while having the incidental
benefit of giving an opportunity for intervention if necessary.
d. Prohibiting Home Schooling When There is Evidence the Child May
Be in Danger in the Home
The right to home school is not unlimited. Although parents have a
due process right to direct their children’s education365 and the right to
free exercise of their religion,366 a law that infringes upon a constitutional
right may be upheld if the law furthers a compelling governmental
interest and is narrowly tailored to meet that end.367 One such
compelling interest is education.368 Consequently, states are entitled to
regulate home-school programs and to enforce reasonable requirements
if those requirements are narrowly tailored.369 If the state can
364. Currently, all states note the need for civics or government as part of a solid education, but
it is not a required course in all states. See Charles N. Quigley, Civic Education: Recent History,
Current Status, and the Future, 62 ALB. L. REV. 1425, 1425 (1999). “Although a study of state
curriculum guidelines will reveal that every state notes the need for civic education, this important
part of the student’s overall education is seldom given sustained and systematic attention in the
kindergarten through twelfth grade curriculum.” Id.
365. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).
366. U.S. CONST. amend. I; Prince, 321 U.S. at 166.
367. See, e.g., Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984) (“Infringements on [the right to
associate] may be justified by regulations adopted to serve compelling state interests . . . .”);
Jonathan L. v. Superior Court, 81 Cal. Rptr. 3d 571, 593 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008) (parents’ power may
be limited if they will place the child in jeopardy).
368. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213–14 (1972) (“[A] State’s interest in universal
education . . . is not totally free from a balancing process when it impinges on fundamental rights
and interests . . . .”).
369. See, e.g., Jonathan L., 81 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 594 (holding that a child’s safety is a compelling
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demonstrate that appropriate education is not taking place in the homeschool program, the state should require the parents to send the child to a
public or private school.
States may also deny parents the right to home school their children
if there is evidence that the child’s health or well-being is at risk.370 For
instance, in Pennsylvania, the affidavit that parents must submit in order
to institute a home-education program must include a statement that “the
supervisor, all adults living in the home and persons having legal custody
of a child or children in a home-education program have not been
convicted of the criminal offenses enumerated in [title 24, section 111(e)
of the Pennsylvania statutes] within five years immediately preceding the
date of the affidavit.”371 If this requirement is not met, the parent may
not institute a home-education program.372
At least one California appellate court has held that restricting a
parent’s right to home school if the child has been declared dependent
because of the abuse or neglect of other children in the home is
constitutional.373
In Jonathan L. v. Superior Court, the court
acknowledged that California statutes permit home schooling as a
species of private school education.374
However, the statutory
permission to home school may constitutionally be overridden in order to
protect the safety of a child who has been declared dependent.375 The
two children in Jonathan L. were declared dependent due to the known
abuse of their siblings.376 The children’s “attorney sought an order that
they be sent to private or public school, rather than educated at home by
their mother, so that they would be in regular contact with mandatory
reporters of abuse and neglect.”377 The dependency court declined to
issue such an order, determining “that parents have an absolute
constitutional right to home school their children.”378
governmental interest and that restricting home schooling is narrowly tailored to achieve it).
370. Id.
371. 24 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 13-1327.1(b)(1) (West 2006). The offenses in subsection (e) of
section 111 include: criminal homicide, aggravated assault, stalking, kidnapping, unlawful restraint,
rape, statutory sexual assault, involuntary deviate sexual intercourse, sexual assault, indecent assault,
indecent exposure, incest, concealing the death of a child, endangering the welfare of children,
dealing in infant children, prostitution, corruption of minors, and sexual abuse of children. Id. § 1111(e) (West Supp. 2009).
372. Id.
373. Jonathan L., 81 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 593.
374. Id. at 590.
375. Id. at 593.
376. Id. at 576.
377. Id.
378. Id.
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The children’s counsel sought relief by a petition for an
extraordinary writ to the court of appeal, and the court initially granted
the petition on the grounds that California statutory law does not permit
home schooling and that such a prohibition did not violate the U.S.
Constitution.379 The court granted a rehearing in order to provide an
opportunity for further argument on the multiple complex issues and to
invite a number of governmental and private parties to submit amicus
curiae briefs.380 The court ultimately decided that the legislature had
accepted home schools in California when they were conducted as
private schools.381
Next, the court considered whether a parent’s right to home school
his or her children could be overridden to protect the health or safety of
the child.382 The court acknowledged that United States Supreme Court
cases have held that parents have “a liberty interest, protected by the due
process clause, in directing the education of their children.”383 However,
it was unclear what level of scrutiny should be applied to restrictions on
that right.384 The court concluded that it need not decide what level of
scrutiny is appropriate since the restriction in question satisfied strict
scrutiny and, therefore, would satisfy any lesser test as well.385 In
applying strict scrutiny, the court noted that the welfare of a child is a
compelling state interest.386 Moreover, “[t]he United States Supreme
Court in Yoder recognized that ‘the power of a parent, even when linked
to a free exercise claim, may be subject to limitation . . . if it appears that
parental decisions will jeopardize the health or safety of a child.’”387

379. Id. at 576–77.
380. Id. at 577.
381. Id. at 577–78.
382. Id. at 592.
383. Id.
384. Id. Early cases applied a rational basis test while more recent cases have indicated that
strict scrutiny would be appropriate. Id.
385. Id. at 593.
386. Id.
387. Id. (quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 233–34 (1972)). See also Cassady v.
Signorelli, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d 545, 549 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) (holding that trial court had discretion to
order custodial parent to send child to an appropriate public, private, or parochial school, rather than
homeschool, in light of trial court’s determinations that mother had difficulty coping with the
stresses and pressures of life, had questionable decision-making ability, and had “delusional quality
in her thinking”); Sloand v. Sloand, 816 N.Y.S.2d 603, 605 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006) (modification of
custody order, pursuant to which mother had sole custody of child, to grant father custody of child,
was in child’s best interests; mother, who suffered from either schizotypal personality disorder or
undifferentiated schizophrenia, intended to home school child, although she lacked teaching
experience, had not had full-time employment for many years, and had failed to respect child’s
educational requirements, such as regular and punctual attendance).
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But even the compelling state interest will not justify a restriction
unless the restriction is narrowly tailored to meet that interest.388 In
Jonathan L., the restriction at issue was a court order preventing the
parents from home schooling their children and instead requiring the
children to attend public or private school where the teachers were
required to report suspected abuse or neglect.389 The court concluded
that such an order was narrowly tailored to achieve the goal of protecting
children.390 “Without contact with mandated reporters, it may well be
that the child’s safety cannot be guaranteed without removing the child
from the parents’ custody. . . . As such, the restriction on home schooling
would be the least restrictive means of achieving the goal of protecting
the children . . . .”391
The Jonathan L. case is significant not only because it acknowledges
limits on parents’ constitutional right to home school their children, but
also because it approves of using schools to provide governmental
officials access to children in a way that allows the government to protect
the children from abuse and neglect. This acknowledgment that home
schooling can isolate children and hide evidence of abuse and the
additional recognition that contact with people who have the ability and
obligation to report signs of abuse or neglect is sometimes necessary
even if it interferes with the privacy rights of the parents. The case
provides guidance and support for attempts to strike the proper balance
between privacy rights of parents and the right of children to live free of
abuse or neglect.
2. Community Outreach and Education
While there are many programs that provide assistance and support
to victims of abuse (particularly women and children), people living in
isolated communities may not have access to those programs or even
know of their existence. For example, those who grew up in polygamous
communities may have such limited contact with the rest of society that
they may not even be aware of their rights, much less how to enforce
those rights. Worse, law enforcement in some communities may be
388. Jonathan L., 81 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 593.
389. Id. at 576 n.2 (teachers and teacher’s aides in public and private schools are required by law
to report suspected child abuse or neglect).
390. Id. at 594.
391. Id. The court was careful to note that the children in that case had already been declared
dependent because of the abuse of their siblings. Id. at 593–94. “We are therefore not concerned
with the interference with the rights of a fit parent; the parents in dependency have been judicially
determined not to be fit.” Id. at 594.
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sympathetic to or active participants in the oppressive culture. Programs
addressing the specific needs of individuals in those isolated
communities must be developed and supported.
The Arizona and Utah Attorneys General created one program—the
Safety Net Program—in 2003.392 The Utah Legislature funded the
Program, and the money was used to create a non-profit family support
center for members of Utah’s polygamous communities suffering from
abuse.393 The Program coordinates resources to help victims of child
abuse and domestic violence and holds monthly meetings for
representatives from law enforcement, state and local social service
agencies, advocacy groups, and members of the community.394 The
Program created the Safety Net Directory, a list of government agencies,
social service providers, and non-profit organizations that provide law
enforcement or social services in the area.395 The Program also created a
manual that provides basic information about polygamous communities
to assist human services professionals, law enforcement officers, and
others in helping victims from these communities.396 Texas is also
currently considering implementing a Safety Net Program.397
While the Program provides much needed resources, it may not
reach victims inside of isolated communities. Those who are not allowed
to venture outside of their community alone or who are monitored
closely by those who seek to keep them isolated and oppressed may not
know that help is available or may not have any way of reaching out to
access that help. To that end, widespread advertising, including on
television, radio, and the Internet may reach the widest possible
audience, although even those efforts will be futile if access to outside
news and information is restricted or prohibited.

392. Ben Winslow, ‘Safety Net’ for Polygamists is Tested, DESERET MORNING NEWS (Salt Lake
City, Utah), Apr. 14, 2008.
393. Ben Winslow, Safety Net’s New Chief Seeks Balance in Work with Polygamists, DESERET
MORNING NEWS (Salt Lake City, Utah), June 10, 2008.
394. Arizona Attorney General Terry Goddard, Colorado City/Polygamy, http://www.azag.gov
/victims_rights/polygamy.html (last visited Mar. 6, 2009).
395. Id.
396. Id.
397. Ben Winslow, Coalition Wants Polygamy ‘Safety Net’ for Texas, DESERET MORNING NEWS
(Salt Lake City, Utah), Sept. 25, 2008.
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3. Enforcing Laws Mandating Registration of Birth and Identification
of Parents
Government should enforce laws making it a crime to fail to register
or to lie about parental identity. This will enable law enforcement to
track children who do not attend public schools or otherwise participate
in society. If authorities do not know that such children exist, they
cannot enforce rules such as those regulating vaccination and education.
If abuse is alleged, it can avoid the situation that existed in the YFZ case
in which authorities could not even identify children or their parents for
purposes of evaluating the abuse allegations.
VIII.CONCLUSION
The right to make certain decisions regarding our bodies, our
families, and our religious practices is an essential part of our identity as
Americans. The right of privacy in these very personal areas will not be
abridged without a fight and should not be abridged except in the most
extraordinary circumstances. However, the right to privacy cannot be
used to shield abusers and other oppressors from liability or punishment.
Nor should privacy laws prevent victims from seeking or obtaining the
help they need or the enjoyment of rights they are guaranteed under the
law. Government, including legislators and courts, should find ways to
balance the privacy rights of all with the need to protect those who are
oppressed. It may not be possible to save everyone, but the attempt must
be made, because it is possible to save some.

